Examining the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy by Ardakani, Omid Motavalizadeh
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
August 2015
Examining the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
Omid Motavalizadeh Ardakani
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations
by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ardakani, Omid Motavalizadeh, "Examining the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy" (2015). Theses and Dissertations. 988.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/988
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY
by
Omid M. Ardakani
A Dissertation Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics
at
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
August 2015
ABSTRACT
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY
by
Omid M. Ardakani
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor N. Kundan Kishor
and Professor Suyong Song
The main objective of my dissertation is to examine the causal effect of monetary policy.
The first two chapters focus on the effectiveness of inflation targeting considering the
role of preconditions such as institutional independence of central banks and a healthy
financial system. It also analyzes the time-varying behavior of the inflation gap in
all explicit inflation targeting countries and captures the gradual transition of actual
inflation to its target over time. The last chapter examines monetary unification impact
on bond markets before and after the European crisis.
Chapter 2 estimates the treatment effect of inflation targeting for 27 explicit inflation
targeting countries. Our approach takes into account the problem of model misspecification
and inconsistent estimation of parametric propensity scores by using a nonparametric
series estimator and semiparametric single index method. In addition, this chapter also
examines the impact of inflation targeting regime on a wider set of macroeconomic
outcomes. The findings suggest that the results are sensitive to the choice of propensity
score estimates based on different methods, and the semiparametric single-index model
of propensity score provides the most economically meaningful results. The findings
illustrate that the inflation targeting framework lowers inflation variability and improves
ii
fiscal discipline. We find that this monetary policy regime reduces the real exchange
rate volatility in developing countries but increases it in developed economies.
Chapter 3 analyzes the performance of the central banks by examining their success in
achieving their explicit inflation targets. For this purpose, we decompose the inflation
gap into predictable and unpredictable components. We argue that the central banks
are successful if the predictable component in the inflation gap diminishes over time.
The predictable component of inflation gap is measured by the conditional mean
of a parsimonious time-varying autoregressive model. Our results find considerable
heterogeneity in the success of these IT countries in achieving their targets at the start of
this policy regime. Our findings also suggest that the central banks of inflation targeting
countries started targeting inflation implicitly before becoming an explicit inflation
targeter. The panel data analysis suggests that the relative success of these countries in
reducing the gap is influenced by their institutional characteristics.
Chapter 4 determines the behavior of bond yields in Eurozone by examining the antithetic
role of monetary unification before and after the European Debt Crisis. We study the
causal effect of monetary unification on the European bond markets. We capture the
causal effect by estimating treatment effects of European union. The findings illustrate
that the treatment effects on bond yields varies before and after the European crisis. The
results indicate that monetary unification reduces the level and volatility of long-term and
short-term sovereign bond yields for the period before the crisis, 1993–2008. However,
after the banking crisis, we witnessed a rise in yield spreads due to higher degree of
debt-GDP ratios and higher risk of default in sovereign bonds.
iii
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Introduction
“If central banks continue to focus on price stability and keep inflation low and
stable, there is every expectation that the current degree of macroeconomic stability
will continue.”
– John Taylor (2005)
“Inflation targeting is being put to the test and it will almost certainly fail.”
– Joseph Stiglitz (2008)
Central banks use different tools to steer the economy. Monetary policy is characterized
by central banks actions influencing money supply by a nominal anchor, such as the
inflation rate, to attain their medium and long term goals. The issue of the effectiveness
of monetary policy is a time-honored question in the literature of monetary economics
and central banking. At first, the perspective on the effectiveness of monetary policy was
defined as targeting high employment and growth without inflation. This perspective
on the role of monetary policy had changed to a more comprehensive view of affecting
both inflation and output.
This dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of monetary policy in steering the economy.
First, we examine the role of inflation targeting (IT hereafter). Inflation targeting is a
monetary policy strategy that control actual inflation. Under the IT regime, a central bank
makes public a projected inflation rate and then attempts to steer actual inflation toward
the target through different monetary policy tools. Second, we determine monetary
unification impact. European Monetary System established in March 1979 to link
members’ currencies and prevent fluctuations in the exchange rate. After its success, the
2European Community agreed to sign the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to create a common
Economic and Monetary Union. For Eurozone Monetary Union, a single monetary policy
is set by the European Central Bank. One main reason to form a monetary union is that
this offers a route to low and stable inflation.
The amount of work on the effectiveness of inflation targeting has considerably
increased in the last two decades. On the one hand, researchers examine a significant
effect of inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance (Neumann and von Hagen
(2002), Wu (2004), Vega and Winkelried (2005), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007),
Rose (2007), Creel and Hubert (2010), and Lin (2010)). On the other hand, scholars
argue that the impact of the IT regime has been mostly insignificant (Johnson (2002),
Angeriz and Arestis (2007), and Lin and Ye (2007)). In Chapter 2, we examine the
effectiveness of inflation targeting by applying micro-econometric techniques. Our
econometric methodology improves on the existing “treatment effect” literature on
the impact of inflation targeting that has been proposed to reduce the selection bias.
Self-selection problem may arise because a central banks’ decision to adopt inflation
targeting is related to the benefits from the adoption of IT. This may lead to a biased
causal effect. The literature have attempted to overcome the selection bias problem by
estimating propensity score and match treated and control units to mimic a randomized
experiment; however, their parametric approach to estimate the average treatment effect
of inflation targeting suffers from the model misspecification problem and may also
provide us inconsistent estimates of the propensity scores. To take into account these
econometric problems, we estimate the propensity scores by a nonparametric series
estimator and a semiparametric index model. In order to capture inflation targeting
effectiveness, we estimate its causal effect on inflation, inflation volatility, interest rate
volatility, exchange rate volatility, fiscal discipline, and sacrifice ratio by considering
the role of preconditions, such as central banks soundness and developed financial
3infrastructure.
Most of the existing studies on the IT regime examine its efficacy by analyzing
the behavior of inflation after the adoption of this regime. In Chapter 3, within a
time series framework, we analyze the dynamic behavior of the gap between level of
inflation and inflation target in all inflation targeters. We examine whether the success
in achieving their explicit inflation targets is associated with the institutional strength
of these countries. We test the effectiveness of the IT countries in meeting their target
by decomposing the gap between actual inflation and the target into predictable and
unpredictable components. We argue that a successful IT regime should bring down
the predictable component of the inflation gap to zero over the medium-horizon if they
are successful in bridging the gap that was predictable in advance. Our approach is
motivated by Friedman’s stabilization policy hypothesis (1953) where he argued that a
successful central banker should make inflation perfectly stable. One consequence of
a perfectly stable inflation is that it becomes unpredictable in a sense that a constant
inflation forecast model can’t be improved upon. It should be noted that unpredictability
is a consequence of superior monetary policy in this context. We define the predictable
component as the conditional expectation of the time varying parameter autoregressive
model. Our approach is able to capture the gradual transition of actual inflation to its
target over time.
In the last chapter, Chapter 4, we examine the role of European Monetary Union in
the behavior of bond yields. After forming the European Monetary Union researchers
have attempted to find whether this unification in Europe has been successful (McKinnon
(2008), Rogers (2007), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), Rogers (2007), Ehrmann et al.
(2011), Faini, Duranton and Hau (2006), and Gomez-Puig (2009)). The need to evaluate
the performance of monetary unification has been steadily rising over the past decade.
4We examine the causal effect of monetary unification on bond yields and bond spreads
by answering the question of whether the reduction in the level and volatility of bond
yields is due to monetary unification. The differences between the sovereign bond yields
after forming monetary union reveal the true unification impact. Therefore, we link
the average treatment effect literature to monetary unification context and estimate
this causal effect. We also take into account country specific factors along with the
difference among members and non-members. Country specific factors are one of the
main determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in European Monetary Union. We
capture country specific factors and the selection problem. It is important to note that
the behavior of bond yields and sovereign spreads changed after the European Sovereign
Debt Crisis. Banking crises led to higher debt and a rapid rise in yield spreads. Higher risk
of default in sovereign bonds is considered as the main reason of widening government
bond yield differentials across Eurozone countries.
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On the Effectiveness of Inflation Targeting
2.1 Introduction
Explicit inflation targeting has been increasingly adopted as a monetary policy
strategy to curb actual inflation over the medium-to-long horizon. Under the IT regime,
a central bank makes public a projected, or “target,” inflation rate and then attempts to
steer actual inflation toward the target through different monetary policy tools.1 One of
the impressive features of this monetary policy strategy is that no country has given up
this regime after its adoption. Reserve Bank of New Zealand became the first central
bank to adopt the IT regime in 1990. The ever-increasing popularity of the IT regime
has led several other central banks to follow implicit inflation targeting.
The increasing popularity of the IT regime has naturally spawned a great deal
of academic interest in its effectiveness. Even though the amount of work on the
effectiveness of inflation targeting has increased manifold in the last two decades,
there is no consensus on the overall impact of this regime on the macroeconomy. One
view suggests a significant effect of inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance,
whereas another strand of literature suggests that the impact of the IT regime has been
mostly insignificant. Several researchers find that inflation targeting is successful in
reducing inflation and inflation variability (Neumann and von Hagen (2002), Wu (2004),
Vega and Winkelried (2005), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and Creel and Hubert
1Countries operating a fully fledged inflation targeting regime are: Armenia, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico,
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden,
Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom (Hammond (2012)).
6(2010)). Among them, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) argue that the IT regime not
only causes a reduction in inflation and inflation variability, but also lessens the sacrifice
ratio, output volatility, and inflation expectations. The literature also identifies inflation
targeting with lowering other economic variables such as exchange rate volatility (Rose
(2007) and Lin (2010)),2 interest rates (Filho (2011)), fiscal indiscipline (Minea and
Tapsoba (2014) and Lucotte (2012)) and actual dollarization (Lin and Ye (2013)).
However, Johnson (2002) and Angeriz and Arestis (2007) find that the IT regime
did not reduce the variability of expected inflation. They suggest that targeters and
non-targeters have experienced an unexpected reduction in inflation. Similar viewpoints
have been expressed by Ball and Sheridan (2003), who argue that there is no evidence
that IT reduces inflation variability, output volatility, and output growth. Lin and Ye
(2007) also find that IT has no significant effects on either inflation or inflation variability.
Our study improves on the effectiveness of inflation targeting literature in three
important ways. First, our econometric methodology improves on the existing “treatment
effect” literature on the impact of inflation targeting that has been proposed to take into
account the self-selection problem. Self-selection problem may arise because a central
banks’ decision to adopt inflation targeting is related to the benefits from the adoption
of IT. This may lead to a biased causal effect. Previous studies (e.g. Lin and Ye (2013)
and de Mendonca and de Guimaraes (2012)) have attempted to overcome the selection
bias problem by estimating propensity score and match treated and control units to
mimic a randomized experiment. The parametric approach to estimate the average
treatment effect of inflation targeting suffers from model misspecification problem and
provides inconsistent estimates of the propensity scores. To take into account these
econometric problems, we estimate the propensity scores by a nonparametric series
estimator and a semiparametric index model. In particular, we use the nonparametric
2Lin (2010) finds that inflation targeting lowers real and nominal exchange rate volatility only in
industrial economies, but increases them in developing countries.
7series estimator proposed by Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) to estimate a consistent
propensity score. This estimator can be used when the functional form of the propensity
score and the distribution of the error terms are unknown. Even though nonparametric
series estimator solves the model misspecification problem, it suffers from the “curse of
dimensionality,” as the dimension of the variable space increases at the higher power
of the logit series estimation. To avoid the curse of dimensionality and to relax the
parametric distributional assumption on the error terms, we estimate propensity scores
using the semiparametric single index method suggested by Klein and Spady (1993)
and Song (2014).
Most of the research on the treatment effect of inflation targeting has examined its
impact on the level of inflation and inflation volatility. One of the proposed benefits of
having a monetary policy regime with a nominal anchor is that it enhances the credibility
of central banks. As a consequence the volatility of important macroeconomic variables
such as the exchange rate and interest rate may be affected. The adoption of IT may also
nudge the fiscal policymakers to adopt fiscally responsible policies. Moreover, inflation
targeting can be able to bring inflation down at less cost. The second contribution of
our paper is to examine the effectiveness of the IT regime by not only investigating its
impact on inflation and inflation volatility, but also important macroeconomic variables
such as interest rate volatility, exchange rate volatility, fiscal discipline, and sacrifice ratio.
The propensity score analysis for the IT regime involves estimating the probability of
conducting IT in the first stage. The extant literature has ignored the role of financial
market development in the probability of adopting inflation targeting. This is in contrast
to the literature that talks about the preconditions for the IT regime, where researchers
have strongly opined that financial market development is one of the most important
criteria for adoption and the success of the IT regime. Therefore, in addition to the
8variables like GDP growth, money growth, lagged inflation and openness that have been
used in the literature, we also use bank assets-GDP ratio and private credit-GDP ratio as
proxies for financial market development in the first step to estimate the probability of
adopting IT.
Our findings suggest that the results of propensity score matching using the single
index model in the first stage provides a more accurate estimation. We show that the
effectiveness of IT and its significance vary among different country groups. In the first
stage estimation, we find that institutional characteristics and financial market features,
such as private credits and central banks’ balance sheets, are crucial to determining
the likelihood of the IT adoption. Our results illustrate that the inflation targeting
framework lowers inflation variability for all country groups. However, the impact of
IT is less in industrial economies than developing countries, implying that developing
countries benefit more from adopting inflation targeting. We find that the IT regime
improves fiscal discipline for both developing and developed economies and its impact
is significantly larger in developing countries. In addition to the significant impact of IT
on inflation variability and fiscal discipline, this monetary policy framework reduces the
interest rate volatility and exchange rate variability in the full sample. However, inflation
targeting has an asymmetric effect on the variability of exchange rate among developing
and developed economies. Inflation targeting lowers the real exchange rate volatility in
developing countries but increases it in industrial economies. A comparison between
parametric and semiparametric propensity scores indicates that the semiparametric
single index model provides the most meaningful results.
92.2 Background
2.2.1 Theoretical Context
Since the adoption of explicit inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
in 1990, there has been an explosion of interest in the theoretical and empirical work on
the effect of inflation targeting. Most of the theoretical work has focused on examining
whether inflation targeting is an optimal monetary policy strategy. Central banks adopt
explicit inflation targeting by setting an instrument such that the inflation forecast and
inflation target become identical. Svensson (1996) interprets inflation targeting as a
targeting rule that specifies a target variable and target level to minimize a loss function.
Central banks’ objective in period t is to choose a sequence of interest rates to minimize
the loss function:
Et
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t L(piτ), (2.1)
where pi denotes inflation, Et is expectations conditional on information in year t, δ is
the discount factor, and L(piτ) is the loss function which can be written as the following:
Lt =
1
2
[(pit − pˆi)2 +λy2t ], (2.2)
where pˆi denotes the inflation target level, λ ≥ 0 is the relative weight and yt is the
output gap. Thus, the inflation targeting framework is considered as the minimization of
a loss function over inflation and output gaps. The first-order condition can be written
as follows:
10
pit+τ|t = pˆi,
for τ≥ T , where pit+τ|t denotes a conditional forecast of pit+τ and T ≥ 0 is the shortest
horizon at which the instrument has an effect on inflation. In an explicit inflation
targeting regime, the central bank commits to minimizing a loss function, so that the
target would be equal to the τ-step ahead forecast. The effectiveness of this monetary
policy framework can be considered through two channels of aggregate demand and
expectations. In the aggregate demand channel, monetary policy affects aggregate
demand, then it affects inflation via the Phillips curve. In the expectations channel,
monetary policy affects inflation by anchoring inflation expectations. According to this
view, the inflation forecast as a target provides better information about central bank
actions and influences expectations. This transparency increases the effectiveness of
monetary policy (Svensson (1999)). As in Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2005a), a
higher degree of transparency improves the conduct of monetary policy. The consequences
of the transparency of central banks are a reduction in uncertainty about future policy
actions and anchoring actual inflation and inflation volatility.
In a theoretical framework, Demertzis and Hallett (2007) show that the transparency
of central banks has no effect on the level of inflation and output, but it decreases
the volatility of inflation and the output gap. Morris and Shin (2002) address this
issue through the lens of welfare effects. They argue that greater transparency does
not necessarily improve social welfare. In an economy with high volatile inflation, the
central bank is unlikely to have more information than the private sector, and private
information may crowd out the central bank’s disclosed information, which leads to a
greater volatility. However, Svensson (2005b) argues that the results of Morris and Shin
11
(2002) are misinterpreted as an “anti-transparency.” He shows that the higher degree of
transparency increases the social welfare. Recently there has been a surge of interest in
the theoretical framework of inflation targeting effectiveness through the channels of
expectations, transparency, and the accountability of central banks. Nevertheless, many
researchers attempt to test this monetary policy effectiveness using different econometric
methods. This study attempts to link the theoretical context and empirical frameworks
and addresses issues that occur when estimating the effect of inflation targeting.
2.2.2 Empirical Background
The empirical research on the effectiveness of inflation targeting has primarily
attempted to examine its impact on the level of inflation and inflation volatility. Initially
most of the work focused on examining the effectiveness of the IT regime by performing
some form of an event study analysis. This strand of literature compared the behavior of
inflation and its volatility before and after the adoption of the IT regime. The event study
approach was criticized on the grounds that this methodology does not take into account
the changes in the behavior of inflation that would have taken place anyway in the
absence of the IT regime. The criticism was based on the global fall in inflation and the
inflation volatility that took place during the time this regime was in place in different
countries. Studies in this strand of literature have borrowed the econometric technique
from applied microeconomics to estimate the impact of inflation targeting. However, the
existing empirical literature on the effectiveness of inflation targeting suffers from three
problems. First issue is the estimation methodology. Second, the variables used to find
the likelihood of adopting inflation targeting ignores the conventional wisdom and extant
literature that suggests the role of preconditions in the effectiveness of inflation targeting
such as a healthy financial system. Third, most of the work on inflation targeting using
the treatment effect methodology has estimated the impact of this regime on the level of
12
inflation and inflation volatility. The literature lacks a comprehensive study on a variety
of outcome variables.
Referring to the first issue, the estimation methodology, Ball and Sheridan (2003)
find the effect of IT by comparing improvements in targeters to improvements in
non-targeters. They use a differences-in-differences approach. In their framework,
the average of outcome variables before and after the adoption of IT is regressed on a
targeting dummy. The coefficient of the targeting dummy measures the effect of targeting
on the outcome variables. To reduce the bias from the correlation of the outcome before
the adoption of IT and the targeting dummy, they add the initial value of the outcome to
the differences regression.3 They find that this method produces an unbiased estimate of
the dummy coefficient. In their study, the sample includes seven inflation targeters and
13 non-targeters; outcome variables are inflation, inflation variability, output growth,
output volatility, and interest rates. They find no evidence that inflation targeting
improves countries’ economic performance. After this study, researchers have attempted
to find the causal effect of the IT adoption on macroeconomic performance using the
same methodology. Among them, Wu (2004) uses a differences-in-differences approach
to compare the average change in inflation. He includes the first lag of the outcome
variable to consider the persistence of the outcome. He finds that inflation targeters
experienced a decrease in the average inflation rates after the adoption of IT.4
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) address the question of whether there is a
causal effect of the adoption of inflation targeting on the macroeconomic outcomes.
They argue that the adoption of IT is an endogenous choice, and the empirical findings
3Ball and Sheridan (2003) argue that by including the initial value of the outcome to the differences
regression, they control for regression to the mean.
4One main issue with differences-in-differences method is the serial correlation problem. The response
in the differences-in-differences estimation, which is the outcome variable such as inflation and inflation
variability, is highly serially correlated.
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may not imply the causal effect of inflation targeting on the economic performance. So
the OLS results may be biased because of endogeneity of the IT regime to inflation. They
control for endogeneity using an instrument set including lagged values of inflation,
inflation deviation from the target, inflation targeting dummy, nominal exchange rate
depreciation, output gap, and Federal funds rate as well as making use of a panel data
IV estimation. Their sample includes 21 developed and developing inflation targeting
countries and 13 industrial non-targeters. The results of panel vector autoregressive
model indicate that inflation targeting reduces inflation and output volatilities and
adopting IT improves the efficiency of monetary policy.
Another problem that arises in estimating the average treatment effect of inflation
is the selection problem. Inflation targeting selection is a process that permits central
banks to adopt inflation targeting in countries that meet some economic and institutional
preconditions. The preconditions include institutional independence of the central bank,
a well-developed technical infrastructure in terms of forecasting, minimal dollarization,
a healthy financial system, and well-developed capital markets. Thus, our observational
data lack the randomized assignment of countries into the adoption of IT. Researchers
must employ statistical procedures to balance the data before assessing treatment effects.
To address the self-selection problem of the IT adoption, Lin and Ye (2007) estimate
average treatment effects using propensity score matching methods. They utilize a
variety of matching methods to use a control group to mimic a randomized experiment.
Propensity score analysis allows us to reduce the dimensionality to a one-dimensional
score and to balance the differences between targeters and non-targeters. Their study
employs seven industrial targeters and 15 non-targeters from the period of 1985 to
1999. They use outcome variables such as inflation, inflation variability, interest rates,
and the income velocity of money to show that inflation targeting has no significant
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effects on economic performance. Recently, other studies examine the effectiveness of
inflation targeting using the average treatment effect literature (Lin (2010), Lucotte
(2012), de Mendonca and de Guimaraes (2012), Lin and Ye (2013) and Minea and
Tapsoba (2014)).
One important problem that has been neglected in the literature is the misspecification
of propensity score. Zhao (2008) finds that the results of average treatment effects
are sensitive to the specifications of propensity scores. Misspecified propensity scores
lead us to a biased estimation of average treatment effects. To overcome this problem,
we use a nonparametric series estimator, proposed by Hirano, Imbens and Ridder
(2003). This estimator can be used when the functional form of the propensity score
and the distribution of the error terms are unknown. Nonetheless, a nonparametric
series estimator suffers from the “curse of dimensionality” problem due to the fact that
the dimension of the variable space increases at the higher power of the logit series
estimation.5 To avoid the curse of dimensionality and relax the parametric distributional
assumption, we estimate propensity scores using a semiparametric method. This method
is useful when a nonparametric series estimator does not perform well because of the
high dimension of variable space (Li and Racine (2011)). We consider the single index
model suggested by Klein and Spady (1993). They introduce this semiparametric model
where the response is a binary variable.
The second problem in the inflation targeting effectiveness literature is associated
with finding the likelihood of adopting inflation targeting. Most of studies have focused
on finding the effect of the macroeconomic variables on the likelihood of the IT adoption.
However, a set of preconditions plays a vital role in the probability of adopting inflation
targeting, especially in emerging market economies. These preconditions, which are
5The curse of dimensionality refers to the problem where the convergence rate is inversely related to
the number of covariates (Li and Racine (2011)).
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necessary for a monetary policy to be successful, fall into four categories: institutional
independence, a well-developed technical infrastructure, economic structure, and a
healthy financial system. The most important precondition discussed in the literature
that has a huge impact on inflation targeting is a healthy financial system. The banking
system should be sound and capital markets well developed to guarantee an effective
monetary policy transmission. To examine the role of a healthy financial system for the
adoption of inflation targeting, we choose central bank assets-GDP ratio and private
credit-GDP ratio along with GDP growth, money growth, lagged inflation and openness.
Central bank assets-GDP measures the size of the central bank, while private credit-GDP
ratio is used to measure the financial depth.
The third problem in finding the effectiveness of inflation targeting is that most of
the work on inflation targeting using the treatment effect methodology has estimated
the impact of this regime on the level of inflation and inflation volatility. One of the
proposed benefits of having a monetary policy regime with nominal anchor such as
inflation targeting is that it enhances the credibility of central banks. Higher degree of
credibility may influence the volatility of important macroeconomic variables. Moreover,
one of the requirements of a successful adoption of the IT regime is the absence of fiscal
dominance. Only a few papers (Lucotte (2012) and Minea and Tapsoba (2014)) have
looked at the role of the IT regime in disciplining the fiscal behavior of the IT-adopting
countries. Additionally, inflation targeters may experience less output losses during
disinflations. There are two contrary views on the effect of inflation targeting on sacrifice
ratios (Goncalves and Carvalho (2009) and Brito (2010)). However, the existing studies
using the treatment effect methodology have not examined the impact of IT on fiscal
discipline and sacrifice ratios. Therefore, in addition to the level and volatility of inflation,
we examine the effectiveness of the IT regime by examining important macroeconomic
variables such as interest rate volatility, exchange rate volatility, fiscal discipline, and
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sacrifice ratio.
2.3 Data Description
The data set for this study consists of 98 countries for the period from 1990 to 2013
on an annual basis. Data are obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s World
Development Indicators and International Financial Statistics. Among our full sample,
27 countries are inflation targeters (treated group) and 71 countries are non-targeters
(control group). Table A1 in Appendix A presents the list of inflation targeting countries
along with the adoption dates, target levels at the adoption date, and the ir country
groups. The lowest target rate at the date of the IT adoption belongs to Sweden and
Thailand, two percent, and the highest rate is 15 percent for Israel. Seven countries are
described as industrial inflation targeters; other 20 targeters are developing countries.6
Table A2 shows the list of countries used as the control group. We impute incomplete
multivariate data. There are two approaches for the imputation of multivariate data: joint
modeling (JM) and Fully Conditional Specification (FCS), also known as Multivariate
Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE). We use the MICE method because using the
MICE algorithm preserves the relationships in the data and retains the uncertainty about
these relations (Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2011)).7
To examine the effectiveness of inflation targeting in emerging market and industrial
economies, we divide the sample into developing (DCS) and developed (IND) countries.
Table 2.1 indicates the sample sizes in the propensity score analysis for the full sample,
industrial economies and developing countries. The full sample contains all 98 countries.
The sample size is 2352, of which 1704 are control and 648 are treated units. After
6IT industrial countries are: Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the
United Kingdom.
7For details, see Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2011).
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matching, 647 observations are left for the outcome analysis. In the subsample of
industrial economies, there are 26 countries (10 inflation targeters and 16 non-targeters),
and the total number of observations is 624. The subsample of developing countries
includes 17 targeters and 55 non-targeters with 1848 observations.
Table 2.1: Sample sizes in propensity score analysis for all samples
FULL IND DCS
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
All 1704 648 384 240 1440 408
Matched 648 648 240 240 408 408
Unmatched 1056 0 144 0 1032 0
Discarded 0 0 0 0 0 0
FULL: full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
The dependent variable used in the first stage estimation is the inflation targeting
dummy, which has the value 1 if the country adopts inflation targeting. We choose the
following covariates for the propensity score analysis and the estimation of average
treatment effects: the lagged inflation rate; real money growth; GDP growth; openness
which is measured as exports plus imports divided by GDP, indicating the total trade as a
percentage of GDP; central bank assets-GDP ratio as a measure of financial sophistication;
and credit deposit to real sector by deposit money bank, which is the proxy of financial
development. In the second stage estimation, the outcome variables include inflation,
fiscal discipline, sacrifice ratio, inflation variability, interest rate volatility, and real
exchange rate volatility. Following Lin and Ye (2007), we measure inflation variability
by the standard deviation of a three-year moving average of inflation. Real exchange
volatility defined as the standard deviation of a three-year moving average of real
exchange rates and interest rate volatility defined as the standard deviation of a three-year
moving average of 10-year government bond interest rates. We consider government
debt-GDP ratio as an inverse proxy of fiscal discipline. Sacrifice ratio is measured by the
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ratio of the change in output growth to the change in inflation.
2.4 The Impact of Inflation Targeting
To find the impact of inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance, we use
propensity score analysis. Propensity score analysis is a quasi-experimental design used
to estimate causal effects in observational studies, i.e., studies where units are not
randomized to treatment. The literature on the IT effective focuses on the propensity
score matching analysis. In the propensity score matching model the data are balanced
through resampling or matching control units to treated ones on probabilities of receiving
treatment, i.e., the propensity scores.
2.4.1 Treatment Effects of Inflation Targeting
Most approaches to estimating the effects of inflation targeting on inflation and
inflation variability fall into estimating average treatment effects. In our study, inflation
targeting is considered as a treatment indicating by a binary random variable, Ti = {0, 1}.
The outcome of interest is denoted by Yi. We specify the inflation rate, the measure of
fiscal discipline, inflation variability, interest rate volatility, and exchange rate volatility,
sacrifice ratio as the outcome variables. We attempt to find whether Yi is affected by the
inflation targeting framework. For each country, there are two potential outcomes. Y0i is
the outcome when inflation targeting is not adopted, while Y1i is the potential outcome
if this strategy is adopted.
potential outcome =
 Y1i if Ti = 1Y0i if Ti = 0. (2.3)
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We would like to know the causal effect of the adoption of inflation targeting in country
i, which is the difference between Y1i and Y0i.
8 The observed outcome, Yi, can be written
in terms of potential outcomes as:
Yi = TiY1i + (1− Ti)Y0i
= Y0i + (Y1i − Y0i)Ti, (2.4)
where Y1i − Y0i is the causal effect of implementing inflation targeting. The average
treatment effect can be expressed by the average treatment effect on the treated (AT T)
and selection bias.
τate = E[Yi | Ti = 1]−E[Yi | Ti = 0] =E[Y1i | Ti = 1]−E[Y0i | Ti = 1]
+E[Y0i | Ti = 1]−E[Y0i | Ti = 0], (2.5)
where E[Y1i | Ti = 1]−E[Y0i | Ti = 1] is the average treatment effect on the treated and
E[Y0i | Ti = 1]−E[Y0i | Ti = 0] is the selection bias. Equation (2.5) provides the average
causal effect of the outcomes of interest on targeters, which is the expected effect of IT
on a randomly drawn country from our sample. The average treatment effect on the
treated is the mean effect for those countries that actually have adopted an inflation
targeting framework. This effect can be written as the following:
τat t = E[Y1i − Y0i | Ti = 1]. (2.6)
We consider two assumptions to estimate τate and τat t . First, the treatment must be
8We do not observe both Y1i and Y0i , since each country is either targeter or non-targeter. This is
called ‘missing data problem’ introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
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randomized across countries, the “unconfoundedness assumption.” 9 Second, the
likelihood that a country adopts inflation targeting lies between zero and one, the
overlap assumption.10 In our case, the randomization of inflation targeting is infeasible.
A central banks’ decision is based on whether it adopts IT and its decision relates to the
benefits from that treatment, Yi1 − Yi0. Therefore, there is self-selection into adopting
inflation targeting.
2.4.2 Propensity Score Analysis
Inflation targeting selection is a process that permits central banks to adopt inflation
targeting in countries that meet some economic and institutional preconditions. Selection
bias arises when targeters differ from non-targeters for reasons other than the specific
monetary policy framework. Our observational data lack the randomized assignment
of countries into the adoption of IT. In this case unconfoundedness assumption will
be violated. One way to overcome selection problem is to randomize the assignment,
because in a random assignment Ti is independent of potential outcomes. Researchers
employ statistical procedures to balance the data before assessing treatment effects. One
way to estimate average treatment effect when the unconfoundedness assumption does
not hold is propensity score analysis (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). The benefits of
using propensity score analysis are as follows. First, this method reduces dimensionality
to a one-dimensional score. Second, propensity scores balance the differences between
inflation targeting countries and non-targeters.11
The propensity score is the “conditional probability of assignment to a particular
9Unconfoundedness or ignorability assumption states that (Y1i , Y0i) |= Ti | X i for all X i .
10Overlap assumption declates that 0< pi(X i)< 1. The combination of both ‘ignorability’ and ‘overlap’
assumptions is called ‘strong ignorability assumption’ (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)).
11Targeters and non-targeters with the same value of the propensity score have the same distribution
of the observed covariate.
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treatment given a vector of observed covariates” (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), p. 41).
The probability of being treated can be written as the following:
pi(X i)≡ Pr(Ti = 1 | X i). (2.7)
The balancing property under exogeneity suggests that:
Ti |= X i | pi(X i). (2.8)
Thus, the ignorability assumption with the propensity score can be written as follows:
(Y1i, Y0i) |= Ti | pi(X i). (2.9)
Propensity score analysis includes two stages. In the first stage, we estimate propensity
score, the conditional probability of adopting IT. In the second stage, we match each
IT country with a non-targeter based on the set of covariates. After defining a distance
measure, we choose the matching algorithm. We report the results of estimating the
average treatment effect on the treated using nearest neighbor matching.12 Nearest
neighbor matching selects the r best non-targeter matches for each inflation targeting
country. Finally, we use the matched sample for the outcome analysis.
12The results of nearest neighbor matching is reported. However, we perform the matching procedure
using full, optimal, and genetic matching and we find the similar results for all other matching methods.
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2.4.3 Impact Evaluation through a Propensity Score Matching Model
We use different estimates of propensity score to examine the effect of the IT
framework on a variety of outcome variables by estimating the average treatment
effect on the treated. First, we use the parametric estimate of propensity score. Then, we
estimate the propensity score using the nonparametric estimation proposed by (Hirano,
Imbens and Ridder (2003)) and a semiparametric single index method.
Parametric Propensity Scores
In the first stage of propensity score matching, we can use a probit model or a logit
model to estimate the propensity scores. Thus, we define the conditional probability of
receiving treatment as follows:
pi(X i) = E(Ti | X i) = (2pi)−1/2ex p[−(X iβi)2/2] (2.10)
or
pi(X i) =
eX iβi
1+ eX iβi
, (2.11)
where pi denotes Pr(Ti = 1 | X i). We define G(·) as the distribution function. Thus, β is
selected to maximize the log-likelihood:
L (β) =
N∑
i=1
yi log[G(x iβ)] + (1− yi) log[1− G(x iβ)]. (2.12)
In the first stage estimation of treatment effects, we examine the role of institutional
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characteristics and macroeconomic performance on the likelihood of adopting IT. The
results of the probit model are presented in Table 2.2.13 We find a significant and negative
relation between openness and the likelihood of adopting IT for the full sample, industrial
economies and developing countries. A higher degree of openness lowers the probability
of adopting IT. As pointed out by Romer (1993), more open economies are less likely to
adopt inflation targeting. Under monetary expansion, the real exchange rate depreciates.
Since the harms of real depreciation are greater in more open economies, the degree of
openness and the benefits of expansion are inversely related. Our findings show that
the real money growth is significant and positively associated with the probability of
adopting IT. Money growth has an inflationary pressure, and it increases the likelihood
of adopting inflation targeting. Moreover, GDP growth as an indicator of the level of
economic development is inversely correlated with the probability of the IT adoption.
Our results are consistent with Lucotte (2012) and Samarina, Terpstra and De Haan
(2013).
Preconditions play a crucial role in the inflation targeting literature, especially in
emerging market economies. The preconditions are necessary for a monetary policy to
be successful. These preconditions fall into four categories: institutional independence,
well-developed technical infrastructure, economic structure, and a healthy financial
system. The most important precondition discussed in the literature that has a huge
impact on inflation targeting is a healthy financial system. The banking system should
be sound and capital markets well developed to guarantee an effective monetary policy
transmission. To examine the role of a healthy financial system for the adoption of
inflation targeting we choose central bank assets-GDP ratio and private credit-GDP
ratio. Central bank assets-GDP measures the size of the central bank. In our parametric
set up, we find that as central banks’ balance sheets expand the probability of the IT
13We also estimate the propensity score using a logit model (Equations 2.11). The results are similar
to the probit estimation.
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Table 2.2: Probit models for the full sample, industrial and
developing countries
FULL IND DCS
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged GDP Growth -0.099∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.046) (0.014)
Lagged Credit Deposit 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged Money Growth 0.005∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
Lagged CB Assets 0.001 -0.015∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002)
Lagged Openness -0.012∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
Lagged Inflation -0.003∗∗ 0.016 -0.003
(0.001) (0.015) (0.001)
a The dependent variable is the targeting dummy, which has the value
1 if the country adopts inflation targeting.
b ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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adoption rises in developing countries. However, higher central bank assets-GDP ratio
lowers the likelihood of adopting IT in industrial economies. Thus, the balance sheets
of central banks matter in the monetary authorities’ decision. In industrial economies,
the expansion of central banks’ balance sheets as a share of GDP causes a loss in their
credibility and decreases the probability of adopting IT. Private credit-GDP ratio is used to
measure the financial depth. Our results show that it affects the likelihood of adopting IT,
meaning that more financially developed countries are more likely to adopt IT. This result
is consistent with Lucotte (2012). Our findings indicate that countries that meet some
financial and capital market preconditions are more likely to adopt inflation targeting.
Figure 2.1 Shows the scatter plot of the estimated probit propensity score. After
propensity scores are estimated, we match targeters to non-targeters based on the
estimated propensity scores. If Ti and X i are dependent, we need to preprocess the
data to eliminate the relationship between Ti and X i. Figure 2.2 illustrates the kernel
density of the estimated propensity scores for the full sample, developing countries
and industrial economies. The kernel densities of propensity scores for the control and
treated units are shown in the dashed lines and solid lines, respectively. We find that
the kernel density of propensity scores for countries that did and did not adopt inflation
targeting in the full sample, industrial economies, and developing countries are different.
This indicates that matching would improve the results of the estimation. Figure 2.3
plots the histograms of the estimated logit propensity scores in the original treated and
control groups and histograms of the logit propensity scores in the matched treated and
control groups for the full sample. The spread of the estimated propensity scores before
and after matching are illustrated in the left and right graphs, respectively. As shown,
the distribution of the propensity scores for non-targeters changes after applying the
nearest-neighbor matching and it is close to the distribution of the propensity scores for
targeters. We examine the balance of each covariate graphically in Figure 2.4–2.6 for all
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samples. If the empirical distributions are the same for targeters and non-targeters, the
points in the Q-Q plots lie on the 45 degree line. Deviations from it imply differences
in the empirical distribution. As shown in these figures, matching would improve the
empirical distribution for lagged openness and lagged GDP growth in the full sample.
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Figure 2.1: Scatter plot of the estimated probit propensity scores
The results of average treatment effect on the treated using parametric propensity
scores are presented in Table 2.3. For the full sample including both developed and
developing economies, AT T on inflation is negative and statistically significant. Its
magnitude is about -2.04, implying that on average, inflation in IT countries has been
lower. Our findings indicate that treatment effects in developing countries and industrial
economies separately are not statistically significant. We also find that the AT T on
debt is significant and negative for all samples. Thus, adopting inflation targeting
positively affects fiscal discipline in both developing and industrial economies. The
average treatment effect on the treated on inflation variability is negative across the
samples. The comparison of the effect of inflation targeting on sacrifice ratio among
all subsamples indicate that industrial inflation targeters were able to reduce inflation
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Figure 2.2: Kernel density of the estimated probit propensity scores
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Figure 2.3: Histograms of the estimated propensity scores before and after matching
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Figure 2.4: QQ plots for all covariates, full sample
(a) (b)
Figure 2.5: QQ plots for all covariates, industrial economies
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Figure 2.6: QQ plots for all covariates, developing countries
less costly than developing targeters. Interestingly, IT has a larger negative effect on
the inflation variability in developing countries than developed economies. The average
treatment effect on the treated on interest rate volatility is negative and significant for
the full sample. It has been argued in the literature that less volatile interest rates is a
sign of more credible central banks. Chadha and Nolan (2001) provide a theoretical
model to link transparency and interest rates volatility. They argue that information
flows increase the volatility of interest rates. Our results show that the IT regime reduces
interest rates volatility. We also examine the relationship between inflation targeting and
exchange rate volatility. Our findings suggest that IT reduces exchange rate volatility in
developing countries. Nonetheless, it increases the volatility of real exchange rates in
industrial economies.
Nonparametric Propensity Score
It has been argued that propensity score analysis is sensitive to the specifications
of the propensity score. We must take into consideration the specification of the first
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Table 2.3: Average treatment effect on the treated, probit esitmate
of pi(x)
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL -2.04∗ -16.16∗∗∗ 0.002 -2.43∗∗∗ -1.55∗∗∗ -2.18∗∗∗
(1.13) (2.61) (0.18) (0.78) (0.47) (0.80)
IND 0.2 -31.01∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗ -0.02 0.29 2.31∗∗∗
(0.24) (4.91) (0.50) (0.19) (0.22) (0.73)
DCS -1.28 -13.56∗∗∗ -0.05 -2.6∗∗ -1.14∗∗ -1.88∗∗
(1.58) (3.17) (0.18) (1.15) (0.55) (0.97)
a Outcomes are inflation (pi), government debt-GDP ratio (debt), sacrifice ratio
(SR), inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi), and exchange rate
volatility (σs).
b FULL: full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
stage estimator for the following reasons. First, the coefficients of the propensity score
are poorly estimated in the misspecified propensity score, and this has an influence
on the estimated AT T (Zhao (2008)). Second, using the parametric propensity score
sacrifices the efficiency of the estimator (Heckman and Ichimura (1998)), even if it
removes all biases (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). The following example illustrates
how misspecification of propensity score given a vector of covariates x (pi(x)) leads
to biased results. Let y be a continuous response, t be the treatment, and τ be the
treatment effect, and β is a vector of parameters relating the covariates x to the response
in the model E(y | x , t) = g(x;β) + δt. Assume Ex | g(x;β) |< ∞. Let y¯1 and
y¯0 denote the sample averages of treated and control units. In a randomized study,
τˆ= y¯1 − y¯0 is an unbiased estimator of τ. Similarly, if we denote the average response
in treatment group i at pi(x) by y¯i,pi(x), then in an observational study τ˜ = y¯1,pi(x) −
y¯0,pi(x) is an unbiased estimator of treatment effect (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)).
Suppose that pi(x) is not known and misspecified to be some function φ(x). Then,
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E[ y¯1 − y¯0 | φ(x)] = τ + Ex[g(x;β) | t = 1,φ(x)] − Ex[g(x;β) | t = 0,φ(x)] and
y¯1,φ(x) − y¯0,φ(x) is not unbiased for τ. To deal with the model misspecification problem,
Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) introduce an estimation of the average treatment
effect by weighting the inverse of a nonparametric estimate of the propensity score. We
use the nonparametric series estimator proposed by Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003)
to estimate a consistent propensity score in a matching framework. This estimator
can be used when the functional form of the propensity score and the distribution of
the error terms are unknown. They estimate pi(x) in a sieve approach by the Series
Logit Estimator (SLE). Suppose RK(x) = (r1K(x), r2K(x), . . . , rkK(x))′ be a K-vector of
functions where K = 1,2, . . . . Denote the logistic cdf by Λ(a) = exp(a)/(1 + exp(a)),
the SLE is defined by pˆi(x) = Λ(Rk(x)′pˆiK) where,
pˆiK = argmax
pi
N∑
i=1
(Ti · ln(Λ(Rk(x)′pi)) + (1− Ti) · ln(1−Λ(Rk(x)′pi)). (2.13)
pi(x) is estimated using this method. Table 2.4 summarizes the results of nonparametric
series propensity scores. The estimation is stopped at the second power, because standard
errors become very large, causing instability in the estimates of the coefficients. Table 2.5
shows the results of the AT T using the nonparametric series propensity score. The
average treatment effect on the treated for debt, the inverse measure of fiscal discipline,
is statistically significant and negative. In our full sample, we find that inflation targeting
reduces sacrifice ratio. Our results show that real exchange rate volatility had significantly
increased in developed countries.
33
Table 2.4: Nonparametric series models for all samples
Covariates FULL IND DCS Covariates FULL IND DCS
X1 -0.26345 -0.22829 0.69219 X5 -0.01792 -0.01525 -0.00527
(0.0575) (0.1635) (0.28033) (0.0029) (0.0053) (0.00681)
X 21 -0.04964 0.01458 -0.99506 X1X5 0.00048 -0.00018 -0.00673
(0.0058) (0.01254) (0.08301) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.00033)
X2 0.01374 -0.00659 0.01262 X2X5 0.00007 0.00010 0.00013
(0.0026) (0.0055) (0.00620) (0.000002) (0.00004) (0.00015)
X1X2 -0.00029 0.00016 -0.01352 X3X5 -0.00002 -0.00091 0.00088
(0.0007) (0.0016) (0.00289) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.00005)
X 22 -0.00008 -0.00005 -0.00003 X4X5 0.00025 -0.00005 0.00015
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.00015)
X3 -0.01976 0.10937 -0.05180 X
2
5 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00011
(0.0128) (0.0461) (0.02318) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00005)
X1X3 -0.00434 -0.0344 -0.02350 X6 -0.00580 -0.09000 -0.00538
(0.0027) (0.0181) (0.00973) (0.0081) (0.1010) (0.01344)
X2X3 0.00023 0.00016 0.00002 X1X6 0.00376 -0.03577 0.00319
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.00033) (0.0014) (0.0266) (0.00690)
X 23 0.00019 0.00104 0.00013 X2X6 -0.00006 0.00452 -0.00023
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.00008) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.00014)
X4 -0.05273 -0.06149 -0.02596 X3X6 0.00001 -0.00191 -0.00011
(0.0119) (0.0409) (0.01662) (0.0001) (0.0044) (0.00023)
X1X4 0.00423 0.00780 -0.01207 X4X6 -0.00028 -0.00040 -0.00013
(0.0024) (0.0103) (0.00754) (0.0004) (0.0042) (0.00052)
X2X4 -0.00017 0.00015 -0.00056 X5X6 0.00005 -0.00235 0.00016
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.00024) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.00018)
X3X4 -0.00014 -0.00523 -0.00039 X
2
6 0.00004 -0.00110 0.00008
(0.0005) (0.0032) (0.00075) (0.000003) (0.0019) (0.00007)
X 24 0.00069 0.00114 0.00052
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.00014)
a X1: lagged central bank assets to GDP, X2: lagged private credit to GDP, X3: lagged GDP growth, X4: lagged real
money growth, X5: lagged lagged inflation, X6: lagged openness.
b ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 2.5: Average treatment effect on the treated,
nonparametric estimate of pi(x)
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL 2.03 -24.54∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗∗ -0.17 0.10 0.16
(1.59) (4.29) (0.38) (1.12) (0.67) (1.13)
IND 0.03 -25.85∗∗∗ -0.83 0.07 0.04 2.37∗∗∗
(0.27) (5.08) (0.65) (0.14) (0.29) (0.73)
DCS 0.87 -17.49∗∗∗ 0.32 1.04 -0.55 -1.84
(2.38) (6.24) (0.30) (1.57) (1.01) (1.94)
a Outcomes are inflation (pi), government debt-GDP ratio (debt), sacrifice
ratio (SR), inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi), and
exchange rate volatility (σs).
b FULL: full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Semiparametric Propensity Score
One problem with nonparametric series estimator is that it suffers from the “curse
of dimensionality.” The curse of dimensionality refers to the poor performance of the
nonparametric series method for multivariate data. The behavior of nonparametric
estimators deteriorates as the dimension increases because of the sparseness of multidimensional
data (Stone (1980)). In other words, in higher dimensions the observations are sparsely
distributed and the speed of convergence decreases for higher dimensions. The optimal
bandwidth converges at O (N −24+d ), where d is the dimension. To break the curse of
dimensionality, we use the semiparametric single index model for estimating propensity
score. The semiparametric single index model is an alternative approach to mitigate
bias arising from the curse of dimensionality. It also can avoid the problem of error
distribution misspecification. The single index model is suggested by Klein and Spady
(1993). They introduce this semiparametric model where the response is a binary
variable. A semiparametric single index model is given by:
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T = g(X ′β0) + u, (2.14)
where Y is the dependent variable, X ∈ Rq is the vector of explanatory variables, and
the functional form of g(·) is unknown. Klein and Spady (1993) suggest estimating the
parameters by maximum likelihood methods:
L (β , h) =∑
i
(1− Ti) ln(1− gˆ−i(X ′iβ)) +
∑
i
Ti ln( gˆ−i(X ′iβ)), (2.15)
where gˆ−i(X ′iβ) is the leave-one-out estimator. After estimating propensity scores using
this method, we use them as weights to estimate AT E and AT T . The function g(·)
includes any location and level shift, so the vector X i cannot include an intercept. We need
some normalization criterion to identify β . It is easier to impose this normalization on β
than on g. Thus, we set the lagged openness coefficient to one. Table 2.6 indicates the
results of semiparametric single index models for the full sample, industrial economies,
and developing countries. The findings show that as the size of the central banks’
balance sheet in developing countries increases, the probability of adopting IT enhances.
However, higher central banks’ asset results a lower probability of the IT adoption in
developed economies. We also find that an increase in private-credit to GDP ratio reduces
the likelihood of the IT adoption. To assess the accuracy of our single index estimate,
we compare the confusion matrices of the probit and single index models. A confusion
matrix shows the actual outcomes versus the predicted outcomes estimated by a model.
The confusion matrices are presented in Table 2.7. It can be seen that the single index
model correctly classifies 75% of the treatment, while the parametric probit model
correctly classifies 71%. It can be seen that semiparametric single index model does
better than probit model when modeling inflation targeting. Figure 2.7 shows the scatter
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plot of the estimated semiparametric propensity scores. Figure 2.8 indicates kernel
densities of the estimated index model. It can be seen that the distribution between
control and treated groups are quite different among all samples. Thus, we expect that
matching improves the results of treatment effects.
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Figure 2.7: Scatter plot of the estimated semiparametric propensity scores
We apply the results of semiparametric single index model in order to find the
average treatment effect on the treated. Song (2014) finds that in propensity score
analysis, the conditions of the single index propensity score estimate do not affect the
asymptotic distribution of treatment effects. This condition holds even when the single
index propensity score is cube-root consistent. Table 2.8 indicates the results of AT T
using the semiparametric single index estimate of propensity score. Our findings show
that IT reduces inflation variability in developing countries and industrial economies.
The average treatment effect on the treated for the industrial subsample is -.61 and
for developing countries is -4.17. The impact of IT is less in industrial economies than
developing countries, implying that developing countries benefit more from adopting
inflation targeting in terms of a reduction in inflation uncertainty. The average treatment
37
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Propensity Score
de
ns
ity Group
Control
Treated
(a) Full Sample
0
1
2
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Propensity Score
de
ns
ity Group
Control
Treated
(b) Industrial Economies
0
1
2
3
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Propensity Score
de
ns
ity Group
Control
Treated
(c) Developing Countries
Figure 2.8: Kernel density of the estimated semiparametric propensity scores
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Table 2.6: Semiparametric single index models for all
samples
FULL IND DCS
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Openness 1 1 1
Lagged GDP Growth -0.46∗∗∗ -2.06∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.97) (0.19)
Lagged Money Growth -0.004 -0.17∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.01) (0.003)
Lagged Inflation 0.06∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.23) (0.01)
Lagged CB Assets -0.15∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.14) (0.04)
Lagged Credit Deposit -0.04∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.87∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.02) (0.005)
a The dependent variable is the targeting dummy, which has the
value 1 if the country adopts inflation targeting.
b Lagged openness is normalized to one for the identification in
the single index model.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 2.7: Confusion matrices for the full sample
Predicted
Actual 0 1
0 1615 89
1 572 76
(a) Probit Model
Predicted
Actual 0 1
0 1698 6
1 584 64
(b) Single Index Model
The diagonal elements contain correctly predicted outcomes, while the off-diagonal ones contain
incorrectly predicted (confused) outcomes.
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effect on the treated for the government debt-GDP ratio for the full sample, developed
economies, and developing countries are -13.69, -25.27, and -7.11, respectively. These
results show two features: first, inflation targeting improves fiscal discipline; second,
the impact of IT on fiscal discipline in developing countries is significantly larger than
that of in industrial economies. IT adoption encourages fiscal authorities to improve
fiscal discipline to support central banks to build up their credibility. Most of developing
countries that have adopted inflation targeting did not meet the preconditions of the
IT adoption. Accordingly, they enhance fiscal discipline more than developed countries
in order to convince the private sector of their commitment to price stability. This is
consistent with the literature that emphasizes the impact of inflation targeting on the
fiscal discipline. Minea and Tapsoba (2014) indicate that inflation targeting improves
fiscal discipline only in developing countries.
Table 2.8: Average treatment effect on the treated, single index
estimate of pi(x)
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL 0.17 -13.69∗∗∗ -0.1 -0.78 -0.75∗∗ -2.58∗∗∗
(0.96) (2.02) (0.13) (0.56) (0.31) (0.58)
IND -0.87∗∗ -25.27∗∗∗ 0.18 -0.61∗∗ -0.69 1.61∗∗
(0.42) (4.29) ( 0.48) (0.26) (0.44) (0.79)
DCS 0.12 -7.11∗ 0.02 -4.17∗∗∗ 0.55 -2.54∗∗
(2.37) (3.78) (0.26) (1.47) (0.69) (1.23)
a Outcomes are inflation (pi), government debt-GDP ratio (debt), sacrifice ratio
(SR), inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi), and exchange rate
volatility (σs).
b FULL: full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
c The results are based on lagged openness coefficient normalization in the first
stage.
d ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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There is no consensus in the literature about how the adoption of the IT regime
would affect the volatility of exchange rate. It has been suggested that the focus on
inflation targeting may move the focus of central banks, especially in emerging markets,
away from foreign exchange markets. Mishkin and Savastano (2001) for example,
suggest that a floating exchange rate system is a requirement for a well-functioning
inflation targeting regime. The reason for this is that in a world of capital mobility,
independent monetary policy cannot coexist with a pegged exchange rate regime; this
is the so-called “Impossibility of the Holy Trinity.” This connection between inflation
targeting and floating exchange rates has led some analysts to argue that one of the
costs of IT is the increase in exchange rate volatility. However, Gregorio, Tokman
and Valdés (2005) discuss this issue in the Chilean context, and show that in Chile
(nominal) exchange rate volatility has not been higher than in other countries with
floating exchange rates. Similarly, Edwards (2006) argues that a credible monetary
policy can reduce the exchange rate volatility.
We examine the relationship between inflation targeting and exchange rate volatility
using propensity score matching with the single index propensity score estimate. Our
findings suggest that IT reduces exchange rate volatility in developing countries but
increases it in industrial economies. The AT T on real exchange volatility for the full
sample is -2.58. Lin (2010) shows that inflation targeting has different impacts on
exchange rate volatility. She argues that the IT regime significantly lowers the volatility
of exchange rate in industrial economies and increases them in developing countries.
Rose (2007) also finds that inflation targeters experienced lower real exchange rate
volatility than non-targeters. As a robustness check, we find the average treatment
effect on the treated using index model with different normalization coefficient. We
normalize lagged money growth coefficient. The results are shown in Table 2.9. We find
similar results compare with the lagged openness normalization. In general, the choice
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of propensity scores, especially the single index model, has a considerable impact on the
treatment effect estimates. As a result, within the framework of a semiparametric single
index model, the impact of inflation targeting is economically more meaningful. Our
empirical study suggests that the single index coefficient regression model, in conjunction
with the proposed estimation method could be useful in propensity score analysis.
Table 2.9: Average treatment effect on the treated, single index
estimate of pi(x)
pi debt SR σpi σi σs
FULL 1.98 -21.32∗∗∗ -0.7∗∗ 0.03 0.008 -0.76
(1.69) (4.46) (0.35) (1.23) (0.68) (1.34)
IND 0.17 -42.1∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.32∗∗ 0.03 1.96∗
(0.30) (5.93) (0.57) (0.16) (0.33) (1.14)
DCS -0.01 -11.04∗∗∗ -0.08 -1.54∗∗∗ 0.57 -1.94∗
(2.01) (3.96) (1.82) (0.24) (0.67) (1.03)
a Outcomes are inflation (pi), government debt-GDP ratio (debt), sacrifice
ratio (SR), inflation variability (σpi), interest rate volatility (σi), and
exchange rate volatility (σs).
b FULL: full sample, IND: industrial economies, DCS: developing countries.
c The results are based on lagged money growth coefficient normalization
in the first stage.
d ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to examine the causal effect of the IT adoption on
macroeconomic performance. To do so, we compare different methods of estimating
the average treatment effects of inflation targeting and attempt to find its effectiveness
within an efficient framework. We use propensity score matching and weighting models
to perform an outcome analysis. Since misspecification of the propensity score leads
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us to a biased estimate, we use a nonparametric series estimator proposed by Hirano,
Imbens and Ridder (2003). However, this model suffers from the curse of dimensionality.
We avoid the curse of dimensionality by using a semiparametric single index model.
This study also considers the prominent role of preconditions in IT adoption. One of
the necessary preconditions before adopting inflation targeting is a sound financial
system and a developed capital market. To find the role of these preconditions, we
choose central bank assets-GDP ratio and private credit-GDP ratio in the first stage
estimations. We examine the effectiveness of inflation targeting in our outcome analysis
by considering inflation, inflation variability, fiscal discipline, interest rate volatility, and
real exchange variability.
The results from a propensity score matching model using a probit estimate indicate
that inflation targeting lowers inflation in the full sample and improves fiscal discipline
in both developing and developed countries. We find that the IT regime negatively
affects interest rates volatility. Our findings based on the semiparametric estimate show
that IT reduces inflation variability, and this reduction is larger in developing countries.
We find that fiscal authorities in developing countries enhance fiscal discipline more than
developed countries as a sign of their commitment to price stability. We also examine
that the inflation targeting regime reduces the exchange rate volatility in developing
countries. However, industrial economies experienced higher exchange rate variability
after the adoption of IT. Our comparison among different models and estimates show
that the choice of propensity scores has a considerable impact on the treatment effect
estimates. Consequently, a semiparametric single index estimate of propensity scores
provides the most meaningful results.
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3
The Success of the Central Banks in Inflation Targeting
Countries
3.1 Introduction
The literature on inflation targeting is divided over the efficacy of inflation targeting.
There is one strand of literature where researchers argue that IT strategy curbs inflation
expectations due to the credibility, accountability and transparency of central banks
(Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Levin, Natalucci
and Piger (2004), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Baxa, Horvath and Vasicek
(2014)). The opposite view takes the stand that the apparent success of IT regime
in most of the countries has been mainly due to favorable shocks affecting the global
economy and these economies would have witnessed low and stable inflation even in
the absence of an IT regime (Johnson (2002), Ball and Sheridan (2003), Lin and Ye
(2007), Genc et al. (2007), Cecchetti and Hakkio (2009))
Most of the existing studies on IT regime examine its efficacy by examining the
behavior of inflation after the adoption of this regime. Surprisingly, there is no comprehensive
study that takes into account the success of these IT countries in achieving their
targets.1 One notable exception is Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004). They studied the
determinants of deviation of inflation from its target for 19 inflation-targeting central
banks from both industrialized and emerging market economies over the 1990s and early
1In a related study Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2014) evaluate the central banks’ response to inflation
gap for a sample of five inflation targeting countries.
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2000s. In their panel and cross-sectional analysis, they find that institutional investor
rating and central bank independence index affect the central bank’s ability in achieving
its target. Our study is different from the above mentioned work in several dimensions. To
take into account the heterogeneity across the central banks and economic circumstances,
our study focuses on the dynamic behavior of the gap between level of inflation and
inflation target. This is important because the ability of central bank to achieve its target
may depend upon economic circumstances and there may be significant time variation
in its ability to attain the explicit inflation target. In addition, our study also includes 8
other countries to make the analysis comprehensive for all the explicit inflation targeters.
Secondly, we examine whether the success in achieving their explicit inflation targets is
associated with the institutional strength of these countries.
The success in achieving the target announced publicly by the central bank is crucial
if the IT central bank wants to gain credibility. There are different reasons why actual
inflation may differ from the target. At the time of the adoption of the IT regime, the
central banks want to anchor inflationary expectations over medium to long-horizon.
Therefore, the short-term gap between actual inflation and target may not reflect the
inability of the central banks to hit their target. However, the central bank will lose
credibility if the gap is non-zero for a considerable period of time. The gap may also arise
because of unpredictable shocks, but the impact of these unpredictable shocks should not
persist for a long period. We use this feature of inflation targeting and propose to test the
effectiveness of the IT countries in meeting their target by decomposing the gap between
actual inflation and the target into predictable and unpredictable components. We argue
that a successful IT regime should bring down the predictable component of the inflation
gap to zero over the medium-horizon if they are successful in bridging the gap that was
predictable in advance. Our approach is motivated by Friedman’s stabilization policy
hypothesis (1953) where he argued that a perfectly successful central banker should
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make inflation perfectly stable. One consequence of a perfectly stable inflation is that
it becomes unpredictable in a sense that a constant inflation forecast model can’t be
improved upon. It should be noted that unpredictability is a consequence of superior
monetary policy in this context. The linkage between the success of monetary policy and
the decline in predictability of inflation has also been shown by Boivin and Giannoni
(2006) and Kishor and Kochin (2007). The empirical evidence presented in D’Agostino
and Surico (2012) for the twentieth century also supports the above hypothesis where
they find that the inflation forecasts based on money growth and output growth were
significantly more accurate than the naïve forecasts only during the regimes associated
with neither a clear nominal anchor nor a credible commitment to fight inflation.
We examine the success of the IT countries in meeting their target by estimating the
predictable component of inflation gap from a parsimonious time-varying autoregressive
model. The conditional expectation of this TVP–AR model is the predictable component
of the inflation gap. The TVP–AR model takes into account the fact that the capability
of the central bank to achieve its target varies over time and is affected by institutional
characteristics like fiscal situation, central bank independence and financial market
depth among others. Our approach is able to capture the gradual transition of actual
inflation to its target over time.2
We find considerable heterogeneity in the success of the IT countries in bridging the
gap between actual inflation and the target in the years immediately after the adoption
of the IT regime. We find that the predictable component of inflation gap was close
to zero for the countries with relatively low level and volatility of inflation even at the
2One could argue that use of a multivariate model will yield a superior estimate of the predictable
component. However, the purpose of our study is not to find the most superior forecast of inflation gap.
The use of a simple AR model gives us a simple benchmark that can be improved upon by the inclusion of
more variables in the information set. Therefore, the presence of a predictable component in inflation
gap should also imply the presence of a predictable component if the information set of the model is
expanded.
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beginning of this regime. However, we find that the predictable component of inflation
converged to zero implying higher degree of success in achieving the target for almost
all the IT countries after few years of the adoption of IT. Interestingly, we also find that
the predictable component of inflation gap started declining few years before these
countries publicly joined the IT regime. This implies that the central banks of the IT
adopting countries started targeting inflation implicitly before becoming an explicit
inflation targeter.
Our findings that in addition to cross-country heterogeneity, there is also significant
time-variation in the success of the IT countries in achieving their targets can reconcile
the two conflicting views on the effectiveness of IT. The finding that the IT countries
have been successful in achieving their target is consistent with the literature that
suggests that IT regime leads to a gradual build up in the credibility of the central
banks (Neumann and von Hagen (2002), Carare and Stone (2006), Creel and Hubert
(2010), de Mendonca and de Guimaraes (2012)). The finding that there is considerable
cross-country heterogeneity in the performance of the central banks immediately after
the adoption is consistent with the literature which suggests the countries that started
with high inflation benefitted more from this regime (Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004),
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and Batini and Laxton (2007)). Our panel data
analysis suggests that the relative success of these countries in achieving their targets is
influenced by their institutional characteristics. In particular, we find that high debt-GDP
ratio constrains the ability of the central bank to bridge the gap between inflation
and target. We also find that financial development indicators and macroeconomic
performance significantly affect the inflation gap in these IT countries.
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3.2 Data Description
One of the contributions of our paper is to create a comprehensive database of explicit
inflation targets for all the IT countries. Table 3.1 shows the list of countries that have
adopted IT regime. It includes information on the date of adoption, the initial target and
the target at the end of the 2013. If there is a range for the target, we consider midpoints
of target ranges. Israel and Poland have the highest gap between the two periods’ target
level, 14.5 to 2 and 8.25 to 2.5 percent, respectively. Figure 3.1 represents the target
level at the date of adoption compared to the target level in 2013. Panel (a) shows the
target level at the adoption date and panel (b) depicts the level in 2013. In general, the
target level has been decreasing over the past 25 years.
Table 3.1 also shows the type of target path for each IT country. The literature
has classified the behavior of inflation targets into two categories: ‘convergence’ and
‘stationary’ target path. Convergence rates relate to the inflation targeters in which
initial target levels were high, gradually converging to a lower level. Stationary rates
indicate a constantly low level of inflation. In addition, we classify each country into
industrial or emerging market economies based on their level of economic development.
Ruge-Murcia (2014) finds that Canada is an exception, where the price-level itself is
stationary.
The data on consumer prices have been obtained from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics and FRED from 1980 through 2013 on a quarterly basis. The data
on inflation targets have been obtained from the central banks’ websites, and other
studies (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Batini and Laxton (2007), Hammond
(2012) and Leyva (2008)).3 Figure 3.2 presents the annual inflation rates and targets
for our samples. The vertical lines indicate the date of IT adoption. A visual inspection
3More details on inflation target data are available upon request.
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Table 3.1: Inflation targeting countries in the world, 1989–2013
Countries Adoption Date Target (adoption date) Target (2013) Group Target Path
Armenia 2006Q1 4 4 EME Convergence
Australia 1993Q2 2.5 2.5 IND Stationary
Brazil 1999Q2 8 4.5 EME Convergence
Canada 1991Q1 4 2 IND Stationary
Chile 1999Q3 3 3 EME Stationary
Colombia 1999Q3 5 3 EME Convergence
Czech 1997Q4 6 2 EME Stationary
Ghana 2002Q1 12 8 EME Convergence
Guatemala 2005Q1 5 4.5 EME Convergence
Hungary 2001Q2 7 3 EME Convergence
Iceland 2001Q1 3.5 2.5 IND Stationary
Indonesia 2005Q3 5 4.5 EME Convergence
Israel 1992Q1 14.5 2 EME Stationary
Mexico 2001Q1 5 3 EME Stationary
New Zealand 1989Q4 4 2 IND Stationary
Norway 2001Q1 2.5 2.5 IND Stationary
Peru 2002Q1 2.5 2 EME Stationary
Philippines 2002Q1 4.7 4 EME Stationary
Poland 1998Q1 8.25 2.5 EME Stationary
Romania 2005Q3 7.5 2.5 EME Convergence
Serbia 2006Q3 8 4 EME Convergence
South Africa 2000Q1 3 4.5 EME Stationary
South Korea 1998Q2 9 3 EME Stationary
Sweden 1993Q1 2 2 IND Stationary
Thailand 2000Q2 1.75 3 EME Stationary
Turkey 2006Q1 5 5 EME Convergence
UK 1992Q3 3 2 IND Stationary
a EME and IND indicate Emerging Market and Industrial Economies, respectively.
b Adoption dates and inflation targets are taken from the central banks’ web pages. Country group
and target path are based on Schmidt-Hebbel (2009).
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(a) Target Level at the Adoption Date
(b) Target Level in 2013
Figure 3.1: Target level at the adoption date and 2013
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of inflation
Countries Period Mean St Dev Countries Period Mean St Dev
Armenia
Pre-IT 10.70 23.20
New Zealand
Pre-IT 10.41 4.57
Post-IT 5.54 2.66 Post-IT 2.31 1.40
Whole 8.69 18.14 Whole 4.50 4.49
Australia
Pre-IT 6.49 3.07
Norway
Pre-IT 4.69 3.04
Post-IT 2.62 1.30 Post-IT 1.81 1.11
Whole 4.10 2.85 Whole 3.58 2.86
Brazil
Pre-IT 12.25 14.11
Peru
Pre-IT 13.05 13.87
Post-IT 6.32 2.49 Post-IT 2.66 1.49
Whole 7.72 7.39 Whole 7.52 10.78
Canada
Pre-IT 5.77 2.73
Philippines
Pre-IT 9.82 8.86
Post-IT 1.96 1.15 Post-IT 4.23 1.85
Whole 3.12 2.51 Whole 7.87 7.68
Chile
Pre-IT 14.43 6.95
Poland
Pre-IT 24.23 8.40
Post-IT 3.03 2.14 Post-IT 3.87 2.82
Whole 9.55 7.84 Whole 9.62 10.56
Colombia
Pre-IT 20.26 4.28
Romania
Pre-IT 22.52 11.98
Post-IT 5.17 2.10 Post-IT 5.44 1.90
Whole 13.82 8.33 Whole 13.21 11.85
Czech
Pre-IT 10.72 4.12
Serbia
Pre-IT 26.53 21.23
Post-IT 3.12 2.62 Post-IT 8.06 3.15
Whole 5.14 4.58 Whole 18.83 18.64
Ghana
Pre-IT 24.82 12.38
South Africa
Pre-IT 11.19 3.65
Post-IT 12.86 4.42 Post-IT 5.71 2.63
Whole 20.03 11.58 Whole 8.94 4.20
Guatemala
Pre-IT 11.05 9.32
South Korea
Pre-IT 5.73 3.54
Post-IT 5.70 2.90 Post-IT 2.89 1.23
Whole 9.64 8.48 Whole 4.38 3.05
Hungary
Pre-IT 14.17 7.40
Sweden
Pre-IT 6.85 2.56
Post-IT 4.87 1.75 Post-IT 1.37 1.34
Whole 10.66 7.48 Whole 3.39 3.26
Iceland
Pre-IT 9.15 8.86
Thailand
Pre-IT 4.26 2.55
Post-IT 5.65 3.32 Post-IT 2.63 1.87
Whole 7.63 7.2 Whole 3.61 2.43
Indonesia
Pre-IT 10.00 9.10
Turkey
Pre-IT 45.02 24.88
Post-IT 7.02 3.64 Post-IT 7.98 1.71
Whole 9.20 8.18 Whole 31.62 26.73
Israel
Pre-IT 16.86 1.84
UK
Pre-IT 5.85 2.32
Post-IT 4.49 3.99 Post-IT 2.17 0.91
Whole 7.11 6.27 Whole 3.48 2.36
Mexico
Pre-IT 16.20 8.68
Post-IT 4.31 0.83
Whole 9.64 8.33
a ‘Pre-IT’ refers to the period before the inflation targeting is adopted by each county.
‘Whole’ refers to the entire sample.
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Figure 3.2: Annual inflation rates and targets in inflation targeters, 1980– 2013
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Figure 3.2: Annual inflation rates and targets in inflation targeters, 1980– 2013
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suggests that over medium to long-horizons though there are significant and protracted
gap between actual and the inflation target at the beginning of the IT regime for most
of the countries, this gap seems have narrowed down over time.
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the inflation rates for all 27 countries.
Inflation targeters like Colombia, Ghana, Poland, Romania and Serbia have the highest
pre-IT inflation levels; the average of those is above 20 percent. However, the mean of
post-IT inflation is significantly low. A substantial gap exists between the means before
and after the policy. This gap for Colombia, Ghana, Poland, Romania and Serbia is 15.09,
11.96, 20.36, 17.08 and 18.47 percent, respectively.
Conventionally, inflation variability is measured by the standard deviation of inflation.
Table 3.2 also presents the standard deviation for pre- and post-IT. A significant reduction
in the standard deviation is noted after the adoption of IT. This dramatic reduction in
the standard deviation can be seen in targeters such as Brazil, Ghana, Peru, Romania,
Serbia and Turkey. Overall, Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 depict the existence of a lower
mean and standard deviation in the post-IT period.
3.3 A Time-Varying Parameter Model for Inflation Gap
In this section, we propose to test the success of the IT countries in achieving their
inflation targets. There are different ways to assess the success of the IT regimes in
achieving their targets. The simplest method is to look at the inflation gap between
actual inflation and the target over time. Figure 3.2 plots inflation and inflation targets
for all the countries together. We observe two main features of this data. First, the
difference between the target and actual inflation is time-varying. Secondly, this gap is
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not just a white noise. This implies that there is a predictable component in the inflation
gap and this predictability varies over time. The predicability of the inflation gap can
arise due to several reasons. First, interest rate smoothing behavior by the central bank
can lead to a gradual adjustment towards the target. Secondly, there is a lag in monetary
policy transmission and this lag tends to be higher for prices than real economic activity.
Thirdly, the central bank may have a medium-run horizon and they want to achieve the
target not in the very short term.
We study the success of IT regime by decomposing inflation gap into two components:
a predictable and an unpredictable component. The predictable component of the
inflation gap should disappear over time if the IT regime is successful in achieving
its target. Admittedly, if a central bank announces its target, it is not expected to hit
the target within a quarter, but we anticipate the inflation gap, that is forecastable, to
disappear over medium to long-horizon. Actual inflation may always turn out to be
different than the target because of unanticipated shocks, but a successful and credible
central bank should not let this deviation persist.
The hypothesized relationship between the predictable component of inflation gap
and effectiveness of the IT regime is motivated by the monetary policy effectiveness
literature where researchers like Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Kishor and Kochin
(2007) among others have shown that the aggressive policy stance towards inflation
causes a decline in inflation predictability. This idea was originally proposed by Friedman
(1953) when he discussed the role of stabilization policy and predictability of inflation.
The empirical evidence presented in D’Agostino and Surico (2012) also support the
above hypothesis. They find that the inflation forecasts based on money growth and
output growth were significantly more accurate than the naïve forecasts only during the
regimes associated with neither a clear nominal anchor nor a credible commitment to
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fight inflation. Therefore, in case of a perfectly successful IT regime, the only difference
between the actual inflation and the target will be the unforecastable news in the data.
We measure the predictable component of inflation gap in a very parsimonious way.
We fit an ARMA(p,q) model to inflation gap for all the IT countries. We find that AR(1)
best approximates the inflation gap data for all the IT countries using the BIC. There are
alternative ways to estimate AR(1) model in our example. We can fit the following fixed
coefficient model:
pidevt = α+ βpi
dev
t−1 + vt . (3.1)
In the above model, the systematic part or the predictable component is the conditional
mean, α+ βpidevt−1, and the unsystematic component is the error term, vt . If monetary
policy is perfectly successful in achieving its target, then α = β = 0. Intercept represents
the bias and the slope coefficient, β measures the persistence of shock to inflation gap.
The problem with a fixed coefficient model is that it would not be able to capture the
time variation in success of the IT central banks as it restricts the coefficients.4 The
fixed coefficient model will restrict both the intercept and the slope coefficient to be
constant across time. This implies that the behavior of the central bank for the full
sample has remained fixed and the persistence property of the shocks affecting the
inflation gap has also remained the same. To take care of the problems associated with
a fixed coefficient model, we modify the above model and allow the coefficients to
vary with time. In particular, we allow the coefficients to follow a random walk. Our
time-varying parameter (TVP) model becomes:
4We also performed a simple likelihood ratio test for the null of no time -variation and in most of the
countries, we reject the null of no time-variation.
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pidevt = αt + βtpi
dev
t−1 + vt . (3.2)
The subscript t signifies time-varying coefficients. There are alternative approaches
of modeling time variation that includes structural break as well as Markov switching
in the reaction function coefficients. The usual test of time variation has a low power
against the alternative, that is, it is difficult to distinguish between different forms of
time variation. As in Boivin and Giannoni (2006), we note that structural break models
are very special cases of time variation and does not allow for the gradual evolution of
monetary policy. Moreover, time-varying parameter model may also be used as a good
approximation of multiple breaks in the reaction function coefficients.5
The state-space representation of the above model is given by:
Yt = Ftθt + vt , vt ∼N (0, Vt),
θt = Gtθt−1 + wt , wt ∼N (0, Wt). (3.3)
The system matrices are:
Ft =

1 Yt−1

, Vt = σ
2
v , (3.4)
Gt = I2, Wt =
σ2α 0
0 σ2
β
 , (3.5)
where θt = (αt ,βt)′. Yt is pidevt and we assume the initial state, θ0, is normally distributed
with the mean m0 and variance G0 and the sequences vt and wt are independent of θ0.
5Stock and Watson (2002) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) discuss merits of the TVP model over
other forms of structural break.
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We use Kalman filtering algorithms to obtain the means and variances of the conditional
distributions of the unobservable states given the data. Petris, Petrone and Campagnoli
(2009) argue that a naive use of the Kalman filter causes numerical instability issues.
One way to overcome this problem is to define more robust algorithms. We utilize a
singular value decomposition-based algorithm proposed by Wang, Libert and Manneback
(1992). Given observed data, {pidev1 , . . . ,pi
dev
T }, we find the optimal ‘signal extraction’
and the optimal ‘h-step ahead prediction’ of states and data.6
Figure 3.3 shows the time-varying conditional expectations of the inflation deviation
from its target. The residuals which are the unpredictable component from our model
are also plotted along with the predictable component which is the conditional mean.
The vertical line represents the date of adoption of the IT regime. For comparison,
we also estimate the conditional mean three years prior to the adoption. Since the
inflation targets prior to adoption are not available, we use the initial inflation target for
each country. In many cases, these targets were known in advance since the countries
announce them prior to the official adoption of IT regime.
We observe some clear and interesting patterns in our estimated results. First, we find
that there is considerable heterogeneity in the success of the IT countries in bridging the
gap between actual inflation and the target in the years immediately after the adoption
of the IT regime. We find that the conditional mean of the inflation gap was close to zero
for countries with relatively low level and volatility of inflation even at the beginning of
this regime. For example, we can clearly observe that the conditional mean in Australia,
Canada, Chile, New Zealand and Sweden hovered around zero for most of the time
period after the adoption of the IT regime. On the other hand, there are countries like
Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Iceland, Mexico among others where the conditional mean
6For details, see Zivot and Yollin (2012).
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Figure 3.3: TV conditional mean of inflation gap and residuals from the TVP–AR model
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Figure 3.3: TV conditional mean of inflation gap and residuals from the TVP–AR model
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was not close to zero during the initial years of this regime. However, we find that the
predictable component of inflation converged to zero implying higher degree of success
in achieving the target for almost all the IT countries after few years of the adoption of IT.
Interestingly, we also find that the predictable component of inflation gap starts
declining few years before these countries publicly joined the IT regime. Since the
targets are not available prior to the date of adoption, we use the target level announced
at the time of the adoption of IT. The results imply that the central banks of the IT
adopting countries started targeting inflation implicitly before becoming an explicit
inflation targeter. Usually, the countries make an announcement about their intention
to move to full-fledged inflation targeting at a future date. There is usually a time lag
involved between the announcement and the formal move to new regime. Our results
that the predictable component starts declining before the formal date of adoption may
reflect this time lag. Secondly, we find that for most of the countries, the residuals or
the unpredictable component in the TVP–AR model is significant. This implies that
the naïve way of just looking at inflation gap and not making the distinction between
the predictable and the unpredictable component would not provide us the proper
understanding into the effectiveness of the IT regime in meeting its target.
Our findings that in addition to cross-country heterogeneity, there is also significant
time-variation in the success of the IT countries in achieving their targets can reconcile the
two conflicting views on the effectiveness of IT. The finding that the IT countries have been
successful in achieving their target is consistent with the literature suggesting that the IT
regime leads to a gradual build up in the credibility of the central banks (Neumann and
von Hagen (2002), Carare and Stone (2006), Creel and Hubert (2010), de Mendonca and
de Guimaraes (2012)). The finding that there is considerable cross-country heterogeneity
in the performance of the central banks immediately after the adoption is consistent
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with the literature which suggests the countries that started with high inflation tended to
have benefited more from the IT regime in terms of lower level and volatility of inflation
over a medium to long-horizon. Our estimates also suggest that the conditional mean of
inflation gap for these emerging economies has gradually declined over time was not
very close to zero at the beginning of the IT regime.
Our approach estimates the conditional mean of inflation gap using information from
only the past values of inflation gap. It is conceivable that the expansion of information
set in the calculation of conditional mean may provide us a different estimate. However,
it should be noted that our estimated conditional mean consistently show a clear pattern
for all the countries and even if information set is expanded, we should be able to find
similar pattern in the data. Moreover, a complex model is more prone to mis-specifiation
especially since we are estimating the conditional mean of all the IT countries.
To dig deeper into the behavior of predictable component, we look at the evolution
of the intercept, α, and the slope, β , separately. Figure 3.4 shows the time-variation in
α and β coefficients. The left graphs show the intercept coefficients over time, αt , and
the right graphs present the time-varying AR coefficients, βt . The vertical lines in each
panel indicate the date of the adoption of IT.
The results for time-varying intercept and slope coefficients suggest that the estimated
intercepts are driving the results in countries where the predictable component of
inflation was significant at the beginning of the IT regime. This was not the case for the
countries with low level and volatility of inflation. These are also the countries with
very low conditional mean or the predictable component.7
7It should be noted that the persistence parameter beta for inflation gap is different than the inflation
persistence parameter that has attracted widespread attention from researchers. One of the implications
of that strand of research is that higher credibility of a central bank is associated with lower persistence
implying that a shock to inflation disappears quickly as inflationary expectations are anchored. For
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Figure 3.4: Filtered time-varying coefficients
example, see Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), Tillmann (2012) among others.
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Figure 3.4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 3.4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 3.4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 3.4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 3.4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 3.4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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3.4 Institutional Characteristics and Inflation Targeting
Effectiveness
It has been argued in the literature that the success of IT depends on the institutional
strength of the country that adopts this regime. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001)
suggest that the success of full-fledged inflation targeting is based on five pillars: the
absence of other nominal anchors, an institutional commitment to price stability, the
lack of fiscal dominance, policy instrument independence and accountability. In this
section, we examine this hypothesis by investigating whether the success of IT countries
in achieving their targets is determined by the strength of their institutions. To do so,
we examine the role of fiscal situation, central bank independence, financial market
development and macroeconomic outcomes. Fiscal stance is measured by the debt-GDP
ratio. We measure the financial market development using domestic private credit to
the real sector by deposit money banks. We obtain the data on these variables from
the International Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund.
Financial depth and financial sophistication are measured by stock market capitalization
to GDP and Central Bank Assets to GDP, respectively. The data are obtained from the
World Bank. The central bank independence measure is calculated by the turnover rate
of the central bank governor’s tenure (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1994)). The
rapid turnover signifies less autonomy and instability in the policy regime. This index
is the inverse measure of central bank independence. The details of the construction
of this index is provided in Appendix A. We also use GDP per capita as the measure of
macroeconomic outcomes in our analysis. Since we are interested in the relationship
between inflation gap and institutional characteristics, we only consider the post-IT
sample period for each country.
To examine the impact of institutions on the deviation of actual inflation from the
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target, we consider a dynamic fixed-effects specification:
Yi t = X i,tβ1 +Wi tβ2 +ηi +λt + εi,t , (3.6)
where Yi t = pidevi t = pii t − pi∗i t . X i t includes strictly exogenous regressors, Wi t are
predetermined regressors including lags of Y . ηi is the country-specific characteristics
and λt is the time-specific effect. X i,t is a (K − 1) ∗ 1 vector of regressors and εi,t ∼
N (0,σ2
ε
) is a random disturbance. We assume the following:
σ2
ε
≥ 0,
E(εi,t ,ε j,s) = 0 i 6= j or t 6= s,
E(ηi,ε j,t) = 0,
E(X i,t ,ε j,s) = 0.
(3.7)
In our analysis, we regress inflation gap on a set of regressors including its own lag, GDP
growth, money growth, central bank independence index, central bank assets to GDP
ratio, stock market capitalization to GDP and private credit to GDP ratio. In addition of
inflation gap, we also consider cumulative inflation gap as a dependent variable because
central banks may not try to achieve their target every period because of the noise in the
aggregate inflation data, but instead they may want to focus on cumulative deviation as
consistent deviation from the target may affect its credibility.
Table 3.3 summarizes the estimation results for the panel analysis. Our panel
estimation includes both the individual and time-specific effects. We also use Panel
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Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) introduced by Beck and Katz (1995). The results are
economically meaningful and signs on the coefficients are consistent with the existing
findings in the literature. To control for the lag dependence, we include the lag of
dependent variable as explanatory variables. The results suggest significant dependence
of inflation and cumulative inflation gap on their past. This is consistent with the findings
of the previous section.
Higher debt-GDP ratio is a measure of increased debt burden and has bearing on
the conduct of the monetary policy. We find that higher debt burden is associated
with higher inflation gap and this relationship is significant at all levels of significance.
This relationship remains robust to the use of cumulative deviation as a dependent
variable. This finding is consistent with the fiscal dominance theory which suggests
that fiscal indiscipline constrains monetary policy and may affect the central bank’s
ability to function prudently. We observe that the inverse of central bank independence
index measured by the central bank governor’s turnover ratio has a positive impact
on the inflation deviation and cumulative inflation deviation. It implies that greater
central bank autonomy lowers the inflation gap and cumulative inflation deviation.
The independence of central banks is one of the preconditions for adopting inflation
targeting. There is a consensus in the central banking literature that greater central
bank independence is associated with lower and more stable inflation (Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Batini and Laxton (2007)).
The variable real money growth is used as an indicator of inflationary pressure
in the economy. We find that an increase in real money growth is associated with
lower inflation gap and cumulative inflation gap. This is a counterintuitive result. One
proposed explanation of this counterintuitive sign is that in many emerging economies
real money growth reflects the level of financial development. This is especially true in
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Table 3.3: Institutional characteristics and inflation gap: panel estimation results
Dependent variable
pidev pidevcsum
pidevt−1 0.419∗∗∗
(0.075)
pidevt−2 −0.180∗∗∗
(0.062)
pidevcsum,t−1 1.224∗∗∗
(0.074)
pidevcsum,t−2 −0.340∗∗∗
(0.066)
Real money growth −0.064∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026)
Private credit-GDP ratio 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
Real GDP growth 22.939∗∗∗ 12.457
(7.995) (8.361)
Central bank independence 1.634 1.400
(2.452) (1.977)
CB Assets-GDP ratio 0.005 0.009
(0.023) (0.024)
government debt-GDP ratio 0.026∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
a The dependent variables are inflation gap, pidev , and the cumulative inflation gap, pidevcsum.
b The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, according to the Beck and Katz (1995) method,
a.k.a. Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE).
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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countries where dollarization is a strong feature of the economy. In this scenario, finding
a negative coefficient on real money growth is not surprising. We also find that higher
GDP growth is associated with higher inflation gap. Higher inflation due to higher GDP
growth will lead to an increase of inflation gap in countries with stationary target rates.
We also examine the relationship between financial market depth indicators and
inflation gap. For this purpose, we look at two measures of financial soundness: central
bank assets to GDP and private credit to GDP ratios. We don’t find significant relationship
between central bank assets to GDP ratio and inflation gap. However, we find that private
credit to GDP ratio positively and significantly affects inflation and cumulative inflation
gap. If private credit is just an indicator of financial market depth, then we would
have expected inflation gap to go down in response to higher private credit to GDP
ratio. However, it has been argued that in many emerging economies a rapid increase in
private credit may indicate overheating the economy and in that case it’s not surprising
that we find positive relationship with inflation and cumulative inflation gap.
Overall, our results from the panel analysis are largely consistent with the literature
where researchers have argued that for the success of inflation targeting regime, stable
and strong institutional set up is required. We find that the success of IT countries in
terms of achieving their targets is strongly associated with the extent of fiscal discipline
and macroeconomic performance.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the effectiveness of inflation targeting countries in terms of
their success in achieving their explicit inflation targets. Keeping in mind that there are
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unanticipated shocks that can affect actual inflation, we propose to test the effectiveness
of the central bank by decomposing the inflation gap, the difference between actual
inflation and inflation targets, into predictable and unpredictable components. We argue
that the predictable component of inflation gap, which we measure by the conditional
mean of a time-varying parameter autoregressive model should converge to zero if the IT
regime is successful in achieving the target. Our results find considerable heterogeneity in
the success of these IT countries in achieving their targets at the start of this policy regime.
We find that countries like Canada and New Zealand have been consistently successful,
whereas there was a gradual decline in the predictable component of inflation gap in
some emerging market economies like Colombia, Guatemala and Turkey. Interestingly,
we also find that the predictable component of inflation gap started declining few years
before these countries publicly joined the IT regime. This implies that the central banks
of the IT adopting countries started targeting inflation implicitly before becoming an
explicit inflation targeter. Our panel data analysis suggests that the relative success of
these countries in achieving their targets is influenced by their institutional characteristics
particularly by fiscal discipline and macroeconomic performance.
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4
Monetary Unification and the Behavior of Eurozone
Bond Yields
4.1 Introduction
To what extent is monetary integration effective? This paper asks how European
monetary union has influenced bond yields before and after the European crisis. We
examine the causal effect of monetary unification by linking the treatment effect literature
to the monetary unification impact context. Our approach determines how monetary
integration affects bond yields by taking into account the econometric problems such as
the selection problem and model misspecification.
European Monetary System established in March 1979 including France, Germany,
Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Netherlands to link all members’ currencies
and prevent fluctuations in the exchange rate. After its success, the European Community
agreed to sign the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to create a common Economic and Monetary
Union. For Eurozone Monetary Union (EMU) a single monetary policy is set by the
European Central Bank. This is the case of a unilateral monetary union in which a small
country pegs its currency to the currency of a large country interpreted as “dollarization.”
Union members adopts the Euro because of greater stability in its value over their
currency.
After the formation of the European Monetary Union researchers wondered whether
the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe has been successful. In order to examine
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its success, they study the effect of monetary unification on price stability (McKinnon
(2008) and Rogers (2007)), interest rate stability (Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010)),
openness and real exchange volatility (Rogers (2007)). One strand of the literature on
the effectiveness of monetary unification concerns bond yield convergence. Ehrmann
et al. (2011) study the convergence of European bond markets from 1993 to 2008.
They show that monetary union led to the integration of bond markets across euro
area countries. The uniqueness of the convergence in the Euro area suggests that
this phenomenal is due to monetary unification rather than a global tendency toward
convergence across all industrial economies. Other studies such as Faini, Duranton and
Hau (2006) and Gomez-Puig (2009) scrutinize the effect of monetary unification on
sovereign bond yields and yield spreads before the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
The literature has mostly focused on the bond convergence subsequent to monetary
unification prior to European crisis. There is lack of extensive study to find the causal
effect of monetary unification by considering both periods before and after the crisis.
The need to evaluate the performance of monetary unification has been steadily
rising over the past decade. We focus on micro-econometric techniques to solve the
fundamental evaluation problem. We examine the causal effect of monetary unification
on sovereign bond yields by answering the question of whether the reduction in the level
and volatility of bond yields is due to monetary unification. The differences between
members’ outcome after joining monetary union reveal the true unification impact.
Therefore, we link the average treatment effect literature to monetary unification context
in order to estimate this causal effect. Nonetheless, country specific factors are one of
the main determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in European monetary union
(Costantini, Fragetta and Giovanni (2014)); members and non-members differ in more
aspects than just joining monetary union. Thus, our experiment is not randomized and
we self-select the treated group consists of all industrial European union members, even
77
though there are some differences in macroeconomic performance of the monetary
union members. To capture country specific factors and to reduce selection bias,
we apply propensity score analysis. Propensity score analysis involves two stages of
estimating propensity score and estimating treatment effects; however, the parametric
propensity score is misspecified and treatment effects are inconsistent. Thus, we apply
the semiparametric single index model proposed by Klein and Spady (1993) to estimate
the propensity score in the first stage.
The results of the average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score
weighting with semiparametric propensity scores show different behavior before and
after the European Sovereign Debt Crisis: monetary unification reduces the level and
volatility of long-term bond yields and the level of short-term yields for the period
from 1993–2008. This holds true for yield spreads—spreads of 15-year sovereign bond
yields over the German Bund benchmark. In other words, yield spreads decreased in
monetary union members before the banking crisis; however, it increased after the crisis.
Our findings demonstrate that after the European crisis, government debt dramatically
increased and banking crises led to a decline in tax revenues and a rise in government
spending which is consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff
(2013).
4.2 Related Literature
Adopting a single currency is the result of constrained optimization. The constraint
is that the freedom of capital flows, floating exchange rates, and monetary unification
cannot coexist. Nevertheless, monetary union dominates floating exchange rate given
the freedom of capital flows (Wyplosz (1997)). One feature of monetary integration is
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that it eliminates the time inconsistency problem and reduces the volatility of exchange
rate. Mundell (1973) analyzes determinants of optimal currency areas. He denotes that
a single currency implies a single central bank. In a currency union, a common interest
rate sets for all members, whereas fiscal policy is implemented at the country level (Gali
and Monacelli (2008)). The optimal policy for the common monetary authority is to
stabilize inflation in the union as a whole. Nevertheless, for attaining price stability,
fiscal authority implements fiscal policies at the country level. Its main drawback is that
the use of a single currency lowers the central bank independence of member countries.
On the other hand, one of the advantages of a currency union is reducing the
transaction costs of trade which is more substantial than the effect from fixed exchange
rates (Alesina and Barro (2002) and Frankel and Rose (2002)). Alesina and Barro
(2002) show that adopting a single currency enhances credibility although its cost is the
loss of monetary independence. Another benefit of the adoption of a common currency
is that it reduces the welfare costs of monetary policy competition when the economies
are open to trade (Pappa (2004)).
Currency union members also benefit from adopting a common currency through
the risk channel. Studies have suggested that monetary unification has strengthened
the co-movement of stock and bond market (Kim, Moshirian and Wu (2004)) which
is the other benefit of unification via risk sharing channel. Researchers investigate the
impact of fiscal policies and public debt on government bond yields. They attempt to find
whether joining monetary union has an impact on risk premium and liquidity premium.
Risk premium is defined as interest differentials between bonds issued by monetary
union and Germany, whereas, liquidity premium is a premium that investors receive
for the risk that they are not able to liquidate their investment. Risk premium reflects
positive risk of default and it is positively associated with the level of indebtedness and
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deficit. Even risk premia among monetary union members is correlated with credit risk
defined as the yield spread between low grade US corporate bonds and treasury bonds
(see, inter alia, Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht (2004)).
If government bond yields include risk premium, increasing indebtedness leads to
higher bond yields. European union countries have experienced a lower default risk
premium; however, this benefit declines with the larger public debt as it is noted in
the literature. The monetary union member’s security is subject to default risk and
foreign asset, e.g. German Bund, is considered as a risk-free asset. Default risk premium
positively depends on the default probability of the risky monetary union member.
Default risk will be affected by a change in the overall economic situation of a country.
In a recession, government revenue decreases and the probability of default rises. On
the other hand, liquidity risk is crucial to monetary union members. Yield differentials
across European monetary union members reflect liquidity risk. If the member’s bond
market is more liquid, the liquidity risk premium declines. Thus, an increase in the
debt size reduces the issuer country’s interest rate. This liquidity effect is reduced with
European union.
The question that has been asked over the past decade is whether monetary unification
in Europe has been successful per se. Researchers, on the one hand, examine the success
by evaluating trade, exchange rate volatility, price stability, and bond yields behavior
among European monetary union members. We find a few work in this line of studies
such as Rose and Engel (2002) indicating that the higher degree of integration is
associated with more trade and less volatile exchange rates. Beetsma and Giuliodori
(2010) and Rogers (2007) also argue that unification leads to more stable prices. On
the other hand, researchers take a close look at the link between monetary unification
and interest rates.
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Faini, Duranton and Hau (2006) scrutinize the effect of fiscal policy among the
monetary union members. They find that a specific fiscal policy in one member will
have an effect on the level of interest rate and its spread not only in that particular
country but in other monetary union members. They address “interest rate spillovers”
and argue that the substantial spillovers are more significant for high debt countries.
Furthermore, Gomez-Puig (2009) find that after the beginning of Currency Union, yield
spreads declined. In other words, after the introduction of the Euro, the risk premia on
the Eurozone sovereigns bonds reduced; however, yield spreads rose after the Lehman
Brothers shock in 2008 in response to domestic banks’ failures. These findings suggest
that the spread increased more where debt-GDP ratios were higher. During 2009, the
relationship between spreads and domestic fiscal stress remained the same. So higher
sovereign spread was associated with future lower growth (Mody and Sandri (2012)).
After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008 the crisis transmitted to Europe. It
was followed by European Sovereign Debt Crisis started in 2009. During this period,
government debt dramatically increased and we witnessed a decline in tax revenues
and a rise in government spending. Most of European union members engaged in
massive bailouts. The banking crises led to deep and prolonged asset market collapses
associating with declines in output and employment. In other words, the real value of
government debt dramatically boosted (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Reinhart and
Rogoff (2013)). Thus, the higher probability of default in European union members has
asymmetric effect on the behavior of sovereign bond yields.
The literature has mostly focused on the bond convergence after monetary unification
prior to European crisis. Ehrmann et al. (2011) indicate that bond markets converge
after the formation of currency union. They study the convergence of European bond
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markets from 1993 to 2008. They find that monetary union led to the integration of bond
markets across euro area countries. However, the co-movement is unique to the euro
area members suggesting that this convergence is due to monetary unification rather
than a global tendency toward convergence across all industrial countries. The literature
links the Eurozone yield on government bonds to the credit risk component. Some argue
that credit risk have been greater after monetary union (Codogno, Favero and Missale
(2002)). In order to identify the change in the yield spreads, Kerstin and Burcu (2012)
examine whether these changes are due to the change in macroeconomic fundamentals
or due to the change in the pricing of sovereign risk. They find that the factors changing
yield spread varies over time. The debt level of a monetary union member explained
yield spread behavior before the financial crisis. However, after the financial crisis, an
increase in the price of risk because of the higher likelihood of sovereign default risk
explains the yield differentials. Costantini, Fragetta and Giovanni (2014) analyze the
determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads. They argue that debt-GDP differentials
are the main long-run drivers of sovereign spreads.
4.3 Data and Estimation Framework
4.3.1 Data Description
The European monetary union consists of 28 Member States. There is a set of
conditions of entry for new states to join the European Union called Copenhagen criteria.
In this study, we include industrial European Union member states who have replaced
their national currency with the single currency, the Euro. The Euro was first introduced
in 1999 as “book” money. There are 12 industrial member states form the euro area.
Our treated group contains these countries. We include 24 industrial countries in our
control group. Table 4.1 lists all countries in the treated and control groups.
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Table 4.1: List of countries in the treated and control groups
Treated Control Control
Austria Argentina Norway
Belgium Armenia Poland
Finland Australia Saudi Arabia
France Canada Singapore
Germany China South Africa
Greece Czech Republic South Korea
Ireland Denmark Sweden
Italy Hungary Switzerland
Luxembourg Iceland Turkey
Netherlands Israel UAE
Portugal Japan United Kingdom
Spain New Zealand United States
In order to compare the results before and after European Sovereign Debt Crisis, we
consider three samples: a time period from 1993 to 2008, before the European crisis, a
time period from 2009 to 2013, and the full sample which contains the data from 1993
to 2013. We estimate the causal effect using annual data. In the first stage estimation,
the covariates include government debt-GDP ratio, GDP growth, real money growth,
inflation, openness which is trade as a percentage of GDP, and the yield spread which
is the spread between each country’s government bond and the average of the bond
yield for Germany and France. In the second stage estimation, outcomes are long-term
sovereign bond yield (i15Y R), the volatility of long-term bond yield (σ
i
15Y R), short-term
yield (iT B), the volatility of short-term bond yield (σ
i
T B). We determine the risk premium
as the spread between each European union member’s long-term rate and long-term
bond yield of Germany. Within the Eurozone, the German market has the majority
of the trading activity between other monetary union markets. Long-term rates are
yields on 15-year treasury bonds. Short-term rates are the weighted average yield on
13-week treasury notes allotted at last tender of month. The data are obtained from
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the International Monetary Fund’s World Development Indicators and International
Financial Statistics.
The short-term and long-term sovereign bond yields for Eurozone—the treated
group—are shown in Figure 4.1. Panel (a) shows the long-term yield from 1993 to
2013. It turns out that the long-term yield among different countries in the treated
group move together except for Greece for the period before the crisis; however, for the
sample period from 2008 to 2013 the pattern has been changed. We do not observe a
similar co-movement for the short-term interest rates (Panel (b)). Government bond
yields in selected countries has been reduced especially after the the European crisis
of 2008-2009. In the next sections, we aim to examine whether the reduction in bond
yields are due to joining monetary union or global factors affecting the interest rates.
Figure 4.2 indicates the volatility of short-term and long-term bond yields. As we see in
Panel (a), the volatility of long-term bond yields fluctuates more after the crisis compared
with those from 1993 through 2008. However, this is not the case for the volatility of
short-term yields. The fluctuations remain high even after the banking crisis. Figure 4.1
and 4.2 demonstrate that monetary unification may affect long-term bond yields more
than short-term yields. Furthermore, The behavior of short-term yields has not been
changed after the banking crisis, but there is a change in the level and volatility of
long-term yields. Figure 4.3 plots sovereign yield spread in European union members.
Interestingly, after forming monetary union bond yield spreads had been disappeared
and risk premia had reduced until the crisis. After the crisis, the gap started to widen.
4.3.2 Estimation Framework
A significant amount of work has been done on examining monetary unification
impact, but none of them point to its causal effect. We link the literature in the monetary
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(b) Short-Term Bond Yields
Figure 4.1: Sovereign bond yields in selected countries
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(b) The Volatility of Short-Term Yields
Figure 4.2: The volatility of bond yields in selected countries, 1993–2013
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Figure 4.3: Sovereign yield spreads in selected countries, 1993–2013
union impact to the treatment effect literature and capture the causal effect of monetary
unification. Joining monetary union is considered as a binary treatment. The outcome
of interests are bond yields, yield spreads, and the volatility of bond yields. For each
member, we define two potential outcomes. The outcome when the country is not part
of the monetary union and a potential outcome in a monetary union member. The
difference between these potential outcomes is defined as the causal effect. In order to
capture this causal effect, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated which
is defined as the conditional expectation of the difference in potential outcomes given
joining European monetary union.
Country specific factors are one of the main determinants of sovereign bond yield
spreads in European monetary union (Costantini, Fragetta and Giovanni (2014)). We
take into account the idiosyncratic characteristics among each member; however, our
observational data lack the randomized assignment of countries into joining European
union and we have sample selection problem. One way to overcome the selection
problem is to randomize the assignment, because in a random assignment treatment is
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independent of potential outcomes. Researchers employ statistical procedures to balance
the data before assessing treatment effects. We apply propensity score analysis in order
to examine the effect of joining European union on the bond yields and deal with the
selection bias in our estimation. In the propensity score literature, two procedures of
matching and weighting are mentioned; propensity score matching model in which
the data is balanced through resampling or matching control units to treated ones on
probabilities of receiving treatment, i.e., the propensity scores, and propensity score
weighting in which the propensity scores are used as sampling weights to perform a
weighted outcome analysis.
Propensity score matching has some drawbacks. One disadvantage of this method is
that it only accounts for observed covariates. Covariates that are not observed would
not be accounted for in the matching. In the propensity score matching model, hidden
bias remains after matching because the procedure only takes into account the observed
covariates. In hidden bias, countries are not comparable in a way that was not measured.
The second disadvantage of propensity score matching is that nearest-neighbor matching
has a small bias, especially when the outcome is not predictable. Thus, matching methods
lead us to the worst covariate balance (Busso, DiNardo and McCrary (2014)).
To overcome these problems, researchers use bias-corrected matching or propensity
score weighting, where the bias will be reduced, especially when the model is properly
specified. Busso, DiNardo and McCrary (2014) argue that the weighting method
performs well in terms of both bias and variance when the overlap assumption is
satisfied. In comparison to bias-corrected matching, weighting has lower variance. To
make sure that our results are robust and overcome the above-mentioned problems
in the matching procedure, we use propensity score weighting in which the inverse
probability of treatment is used as a weight. Propensity score weighting has some
87
advantages over propensity score matching. As Guo and Fraser (2014) emphasize,
propensity score weighting enhances internal validity rather than external validity. It
also does not require a continuous or normally distributed outcome variable. Moreover,
propensity score weighting uses the most participants in the outcome analysis without
losing observations as matching method does. Considering propensity scores as weights,
the population average treatment effect on the treated can be written as the following
weighting algorithm:
τat t = E[Y1i − Y0i | T = 1] = E[E[Y1i − Y0i | X , T = 1] | T = 1]
= E[E[Y1i − Y0i | X ] | T = 1] = E[τ(X ) | T = 1], (4.1)
where T is the treatment taking value one if the country joins monetary union. Y0i is
the outcome when the country has not joined monetary union, while Y1i is the potential
outcome if the country has joined monetary union. Furthermore,
E[τ(X = x) | T = 1] =
∫
τ(x)dF(x | T = 1)
=
∫
τ(x)pi(x)dF(x)∫
pi(x)dF(x)
. (4.2)
where pi(x) is the propensity score. We identify τat t through the moment equation:
E[ψ(Y, T, X ,τat t ,pi(X ))] = 0, (4.3)
where the moment equation ψ(·) can be written as:
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ψ(y, t, x ,τat t ,pi(x)) =
y · t
pi(x)
− y · (1− t)
1−pi(x) −τat t . (4.4)
The solution to the following equation is the AT T estimator:
(1/N)
N∑
i=1
ψ(Yi, Ti, X i, τˆat t , pˆi(X i)) = 0, (4.5)
where pˆi(X i) is the estimated propensity score. Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003)
apply nonparametric series estimate of propensity score in the first stage to find average
treatment effect on the treated in the second stage leading to the estimator:
τˆat t = (1/N)
N∑
i=1
Yi · Ti
pˆi(X i)
− Yi · (1− Ti)
1− pˆi(X i) . (4.6)
We estimate propensity scores using parametric and semiparametric methods. However,
the parametric propensity score suffers from model misspecification and the results of
average treatment effect on the treated will be inconsistent. We apply semiparametric
propensity score for the outcome analysis.
4.4 Monetary Unification and Changes in Bond Yields
Some studies indicate that differences in macroeconomic performance among countries
is the key element of monetary integration. The comparison between the outcome of
interest in members and non-members does not provide the unification impact. In order
the make the treated group comparable to the control group, we first estimate propensity
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scores. Then, we compare bond yields among members and non-members by using the
propensity score as a weight. In this section, we study the behavior of bond yields after
monetary unification and throughout the European crisis.
4.4.1 The Likelihood of Joining Monetary Union
In the first stage, we estimate the propensity score—the conditional probability of
joining European union. We consider macroeconomic predictors such as openness and
real money growth along with the spreads of 15-year sovereign bond yields over the
German and France bonds benchmark in the eurozone. Table 4.2 shows the results of
the parametric and semiparametric single index models. Model (1) summarizes the
results of the logit model, whereas model (2) indicates semiparametric single index
model suggested by Klein and Spady (1993). Our parametric model suffers from model
misspecification and we rely on model (2).
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Our findings indicate that for the period before the European crisis, the higher degree
of GDP growth increases the likelihood of joining monetary union. The results support
the fact that if a country joins European monetary union, they must meet certain criteria.
Our results also indicate that more open economies are more likely to join European
union. This finding is consistent with Rose and Engel (2002) who show that currency
union members have more trade and less volatile exchange rates. The yield spreads
contain information about default risk. We find that the greater the yield spreads, the
higher the probability of joining monetary union implying that monetary unification
lowers sovereign bond yield differentials. Interestingly, we observe different pattern after
the European crisis. The coefficients of yield spreads become statistically insignificant.
In the next section, we explain why the yield spreads change over time by analyzing the
connection between yield spread, government debt-GDP ratio, and monetary unification.
4.4.2 Monetary Unification Impact on the Bond Market
To find the impact of monetary unification on bond yields and bond yield spreads,
we estimate average treatment effect on the treated using estimated propensity scores
as weights. The literature has examined the changes in the behavior of bond yields
since the introduction of the Euro (e.g. Mody and Sandri (2012), Gomez-Puig (2009)).
However, it focuses on the bond market differentials before the European crisis. After the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008 the crisis transmitted to Europe. It was followed
by European Sovereign Debt Crisis started in 2009. Banking crises directly caused the
higher government debt-GDP ratios (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)). We examine the role
of monetary unification since the creation of monetary union by considering country’s
idiosyncratic characteristics before and after the banking crisis in Europe.
Table 4.3 presents information on the pre-treatment covariates before and after
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weighting using logit propensity scores. The second and third columns, E(Y1 | T = 1)
and E(Y0 | T = 1), show the treatment and control means for each covariate. The last
column, E(Y0 | T = 0), shows the unweighted means. The forth column, KS, is the
p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to show a
significant difference across entire distributions. The null hypothesis is that the samples
are drawn from the same distribution. The results indicate that the average treatment on
the treated is sensitive to the choice of covariates. Figure 4.5 illustrates the spread of the
estimated propensity scores in the treatment and control groups. Panel (a) in Figure 4.6
illustrates the standardized effect size of pre-treatment variables. It checks balance
and compares the effect of weights on the magnitude of difference between weighted
control group and unweighted treatment group on each pre-treatment covariate. This
is shown by the mean of the covariate balance metrics ‘mean’ or the maximum of the
balance metrics ‘max’. The left graph shows absolute standard difference using effect
size, whereas, the right graph indicates the absolute standard difference using the
Kolmogrov-Smirnov statistics. In panel (a), substantial reductions in effect sizes are
observed for most covariates (blue lines). Closed red circles show a statistically significant
difference. Panel (b) in Figure 4.6 indicates p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
The Q-Q plot compares the quantiles of the observed p-values to the quantiles of the
uniform distribution, showing whether group differences observed before and after
weighting are consistent with what we expect to see in a random assignment. Before
weighting (closed circles), the groups have statistically significant differences on many
covariates (i.e., p-values are near zero). After weighting (open circles), the p-values are
generally closer to the 45-degree line. This indicates that the p-values are larger than
would be expected in a randomized study.
We apply the estimated parametric and semiparametric propensity scores as weights
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Figure 4.4: Kernel density of the estimated semiparametric propensity scores
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Figure 4.5: Boxplots of the estimated logit propensity scores
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Figure 4.6: Density estimation of the estimated logit propensity scores
ES and KS specify the method for summarizing across balance metrics. ‘es.mean’ uses the effect size or
the absolute standardized bias and summarizes across variables with the mean and the ‘ks.max’ uses
the Kolmogorove-Smirnov statistics to assess balances and summarizes using the maximum across
variables.
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Table 4.3: Balance of the treatment and comparison groups, logit model
E(Y1 | T = 1) E(Y0 | T = 1) KS E(Y0 | T = 0)
Lagged Debt 73.25 65.59 0.24 53.40
Lagged GDP Growth 0.58 0.39 0.41 94.23
Lagged Money Growth 0.62 0.95 0.14 12.55
Lagged Inflation 1.13 1.28 0.21 3.37
Lagged Openness 68.93 76.09 0.10 99.72
Lagged Interest Spread -0.24 1.05 0.20 7.75
Table 4.4: Balance of the treatment and comparison groups, single index model
E(Y1 | T = 1) E(Y0 | T = 1) KS E(Y0 | T = 0)
Lagged Debt 75.64 54.99 0.32 53.40
Lagged GDP Growth 0.58 102.83 0.39 94.23
Lagged Money Growth 1.22 4.74 0.20 12.55
Lagged Inflation 1.40 3.57 0.21 3.37
Lagged Openness 80.19 103.60 0.10 99.72
Lagged Interest Spread 1.24 7.88 0.32 7.75
to estimate the causal effect of monetary unification.1 Table 4.5 and 4.6 summarize the
results of the average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score weighting
and matching on long-term interest rate, short-term interest rate, and their volatilities.
The findings are based on three sample periods: 1993–2008, 2009–2013, and the full
sample (1993–2013). Before the European crisis (1993–2008), treatment effects on
long-term interest rate, the volatility of long-term interest rate, and the short-term interest
rate are -3.87, -2.71, and -3.45, respectively. It indicates that monetary unification
reduces not only the level of interest rates, but the volatility of long-term interest
rates. The results hold true for the full sample (1993–2013); however, the magnitudes
are smaller than those before the European crisis. Our findings are consistent with
Gomez-Puig (2009) who demonstrates that after the adoption of the Euro the risk
1Song (2014) finds that in propensity score analysis, the conditions of semiparametric propensity
score do not affect the asymptotic distribution of treatment effects.
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premium on the bonds of eurozone sovereigns declined. To compare these results with
the impact on yield bonds differentials, we consider the yield spreads as an outcome.
We define the yield spreads as the spreads of 15-year sovereign bond yields over the
German Bund benchmark. The treatment effect of the period 1993–2008 is negative
and statistically significant. The sovereign spreads is highly correlated with growth
during this period implying the effectiveness of monetary unification. These results are
consistent with Mody and Sandri (2012). Interestingly, both the level and volatility of
bond yields had been reduced after forming European monetary union. One way to look
at the reduction in yield spreads is that monetary unification increases the credibility of
monetary policy and leads to the higher degree of central bank independence. However,
monetary unification affects the trade-off between credibility and flexibility of monetary
policy (Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010)).
Table 4.5: Average treatment effect on the treated, propensity score
weighting
1993–2008 2009–2013 1993–2013
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
i15Y R -0.23 -3.87
∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ -0.83 0.06 -2.36∗∗∗
(0.23) (1.43) (0.60) (0.77) ( 0.24) (0.89)
σi15Y R -1.21
∗∗∗ -2.71∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ -0.15 -0.58∗∗∗ -2.27∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.86) (0.26) (0.25) (0.16) (0.79)
iT B -2.93 -3.45
∗∗ -0.39 -1.82∗ -2.47 -2.18∗
(2.77) (1.71) (0.47) (0.96) (2.23) (1.17)
σiT B -2.06
∗ -0.17 0.44 0.81∗ -1.31 -0.27
(1.11) (0.60) (0.34) (0.42) (0.83) ( 0.67)
a Outcomes are long-term interest rate (i15Y R), The volatility of long-term interest
rates (σi15Y R), short-term interest rate (iT B), and the volatility of short-term interest
rate (σiT B).
b (1) is the AT T based on the parametric model. (2) is the AT T based on index
model.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Average treatment effect on the treated, propensity score
matching
1993–2008 2009–2013 1993–2013
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
i15Y R 0.17 -1.38 -0.81 1.41 0.18 -10.21
∗∗∗
(0.46) (6.40) (0.85) (2.89) ( 0.36) (3.79)
σi15Y R -0.85 -1.72 0.02 -14.19 -0.25 -8.83
∗∗∗
(0.53) (3.87) (0.36) (19.09) (0.17) (2.76)
iT B -4.97 -1.62 -2.34
∗∗ -2.81∗ -2.38 -3.83∗∗∗
(3.87) (3.33) (0.98) (1.69) (2.03) (1.22)
σiT B -3.76 -0.58 -0.57 0.99 -1.21 -1.41
∗
(1.99) (2.27) (0.59) (1.01) (1.03) (0.64)
a Outcomes are long-term interest rate (i15Y R), The volatility of long-term interest
rates (σi15Y R), short-term interest rate (iT B), and the volatility of short-term interest
rate (σiT B).
b (1) is the AT T based on the parametric model. (2) is the AT T based on index
model.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The behavior of bond yields dramatically changed after the european crisis. European
Sovereign Debt Crisis started in 2009 followed by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
caused an increase in the government debt-GDP ratios in monetary union members.
Our findings show that there is a disconnection between joining European monetary
union and a reduction in short-term and long-term sovereign bond yields. It can be
seen in Table 4.5 that treatment effects for the period after the crisis are not statistically
significant. Paolo, Giancarlo and Ciovanni (2015) argue that this disconnection is due
to the role of the higher risk of default in sovereign bonds. This can be the main reason
of widening government bond yield differentials across eurozone countries. In other
words, after a financial crisis government debt dramatically increased. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2013) argue that banking crises lead to sharp declines in tax revenues as well
as significant increases in government spending. Thus, defaults in European union
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members tend to rise when many countries are simultaneously experiencing domestic
banking crises. Costantini, Fragetta and Giovanni (2014) also show that debt-GDP
differentials are the main long-run drivers of sovereign spreads. Based on Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) the aftermath of severe financial crises explains three characteristics.
First, asset market collapses are deep and prolonged. Second, the aftermath of banking
crises is associated with declines in output. Third, the value of government debt tends
to explode, rising an average of 86 percent.
4.5 Robustness Check
As a robustness check, we apply the semiparametric propensity score based on
different normalization. Table 4.7 summarizes the results of the first stage estimation
by normalizing the lagged money growth coefficient. We find a consistent results with
normalization based on lagged debt coefficient. Model (1) indicates the results from 1993
to 2008. We find negative and significant results for the lagged government debt-GDP
ratio coefficient. This is consistent with Lane (2012) suggesting that higher debt lowers
the likelihood of joining monetary union. Thus, public debt plays a significant role in
monetary unification. Codogno, Favero and Missale (2002) also argue that liquidity
explains only a small fraction of sovereign spreads and public debt plays a role especially
for Italy and Spain.The results confirm that more open economies have the higher chance
to join European union. We also find that the higher the interest rate spread, the more
likely that the country joins European union. Furthermore, higher degree of debt-GDP
ratio lowers the probability of forming monetary union.
The results of average treatment effect on the treated through propensity score
weighting is presented in Table 4.8. It indicates that joining monetary union lowers the
level and volatility of long-term interest rates and the level and volatility of short-term
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interest rates for the period from 1993 to 2008. Faini, Duranton and Hau (2006)
link between monetary unification and sovereign bond spreads through the budget
balance and sovereign debt channel. Different results after the crisis can be explained
by liquidity risks, primarily expected fiscal imbalances ( debt-GDP differentials) as the
main determinants of sovereign bond yield spread in the long run. This suggests that
policy makers are willing to reduce the high sovereign spreads.
Table 4.7: The first stage estimation: the
probability of joining EMU
(1) (2)
Lagged Money Growth 1 1
Lagged Debt -0.16∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.0009)
Lagged GDP Growth 0.03∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.0001)
Lagged Inflation -5.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.86) (0.004)
Lagged Openness 0.22∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.0005)
Lagged itbspread 2.35∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.21) (0.002)
a The dependent variable is the binary variable of
joining EMU.
b (1) is the index model for the sample 1993–2008.
(2) is the index model for the sample 1993–2013.
b Lagged real money growth is normalized to one for
the identification in the single index model.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.8: Average
treatment effect on the
treated, propensity score
weighting
(1) (2)
i15Y R -1.71
∗ -1.78∗∗
(1.03) (0.73)
σi15Y R -5.02
∗ -1.86∗
(2.67) (0.58)
iT B -3.72
∗ -2.06∗
(2.22) (1.07)
σiT B -2.73
∗∗∗ 0.03
(1.03) (0.56)
b (1) is the AT T from the
index model for the sample
1993–2008. (2) is the AT T
from the index model for the
sample 1993–2013.
b Lagged real money growth is
normalized to one in the first
stage estimation.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.10: Average treatment on the treated, all members except
Greece and Portugal
1993–2008 2009–2013 1993–2013
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
i15Y R -0.27 -4.34
∗∗∗ 1.04 -1.01 -0.12 -2.81∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.89) (0.69) (0.98) ( 0.25) (1.18)
σi15Y R -1.04
∗∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗ 0.53∗ -0.11 -0.58∗∗∗ -2.82∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.33) (0.29) (0.39) (0.14) (1.03)
iT B -3.65 -4.12
∗∗∗ -0.14 -0.13 -3.23 -1.98
(3.36) (1.71) (0.52) (0.67) (2.84) (1.25)
σiT B -2.2 -2.39 0.7
∗ 1.17∗∗∗ -1.44 -1.05∗∗∗
(1.36) (1.78) (0.39) (0.43) (1.04) ( 0.55)
a Outcomes are long-term interest rate (i15Y R), The volatility of long-term interest
rates (σi15Y R), short-term interest rate (iT B), and the volatility of short-term interest
rate (σiT B).
b (1) is the AT T based on the parametric model. (2) is the AT T based on index
model.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.11: Average treatment effect on the treated, propensity score
matching, No Greece and Portugal
1993–2008 2009–2013 1993–2013
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
i15Y R -0.03 -2.48
∗ 0.58 -1.37 0.12 -6.38∗∗∗
(0.43) (1.44) (0.61) (8.75) ( 0.34) (2.13)
σi15Y R -0.89
∗∗∗ -0.3 0.12 -1.73 -0.39∗∗∗ -3.14∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.42) (0.31) (5.21) (0.13) (1.00)
iT B -4.73 -1.81 -0.32 1.84 0.21 -8.8
∗∗∗
(3.53) (1.87) (0.81) (1.93) (0.38) (2.93)
σiT B -2.97
∗ -0.41 0.82 1.75 -0.61∗ -4.84∗∗∗
(1.81) (0.57) (0.49) (1.13) (0.37) (1.64)
a Outcomes are long-term interest rate (i15Y R), The volatility of long-term interest
rates (σi15Y R), short-term interest rate (iT B), and the volatility of short-term
interest rate (σiT B).
b (1) is the AT T based on the parametric model. (2) is the AT T based on index
model.
c ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
Country specific factors are one of the main determinants of sovereign bond yields
in European monetary union. We apply propensity score analysis to capture the country
specific factors and to overcome the self-selection problem. In the first stage estimation,
in order to deal with model misspecification we apply a semiparametric single index
model. We find that the higher degree of GDP growth increases the likelihood of joining
monetary union. Interestingly, currency union members have more trade and less volatile
exchange rates. We study the default risk by measuring the sovereign yield differentials
in the Eurozone. We indicate that monetary unification lowers sovereign bond yield
differentials.
We use the estimated parametric and semiparametric propensity scores in order to
estimate the causal effect of monetary unification. The average treatment effect on the
treated results indicate that monetary unification reduces not only the level of interest
rates, but the volatility of long-term interest rates meaning that after the introduction
of the Euro the risk premium on the bonds of Eurozone sovereigns declined. Monetary
unification increases the credibility of monetary policy and leads to the higher degree
of central bank independence. The behavior of bond yields and sovereign spreads
changed after the European Sovereign Debt Crisis started in 2009. Banking crises caused
higher debt and we witnessed a rapid rise in yield spreads and the connection between
banks and sovereign. Higher risk of default in sovereign bonds was the main reason
of widening government bond yield differentials across Eurozone countries. Investors
started to question the ability of certain monetary union governments of meeting their
debt obligations and began requiring higher default risk premia.
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Appendix A
This Appendix provides the list of inflation targeting countries along with the adoption
dates, target level at the adoption date and their country groups. It also presents the
control units with their country groups.
Table A1: Treated group (targeters)
Countries Adoption Date Target Group
Armenia 2006Q1 4 DCS
Australia 1993Q2 3 IND
Brazil 1999Q2 8 DCS
Canada 1991Q1 4 IND
Chile 1999Q3 3 DCS
Colombia 1999Q3 5 DCS
Czech 1997Q4 6 DCS
Ghana 2002Q1 12 DCS
Guatemala 2005Q1 5 DCS
Hungary 2001Q2 7 DCS
Iceland 2001Q1 4 IND
Indonesia 2005Q3 5 DCS
Israel 1992Q1 15 DCS
Mexico 2001Q1 5 DCS
New Zealand 1989Q4 4 IND
Norway 2001Q1 3 IND
Peru 2002Q1 3 DCS
Philippines 2002Q1 5 DCS
Poland 1998Q1 8 DCS
Romania 2005Q3 8 DCS
Serbia 2006Q3 8 DCS
South Africa 2000Q1 3 DCS
South Korea 1998Q2 9 DCS
Sweden 1993Q1 2 IND
Thailand 2000Q2 2 DCS
Turkey 2006Q1 5 DCS
UK 1992Q3 3 IND
DCS denotes developing countries and IND indicates
industrial economies.
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Table A2: Control group (non-targeters)
Countries Group Countries Group
Albania DCS Madagascar DCS
Algeria DCS Malawi DCS
Argentina DCS Malaysia DCS
Armenia DCS Maldives DCS
Austria IND Mali DCS
Azerbaijan DCS Malta IND
Belarus DCS Moldova DCS
Belgium DCS Morocco DCS
Belize DCS Mozambique DCS
Bolivia DCS Myanmar DCS
Bulgaria DCS Nepal DCS
China DCS Netherlands IND
Costa Rica DCS Nicaragua DCS
Cyprus IND Niger DCS
Denmark IND Saudi Arabia DCS
Ecuador DCS Senegal DCS
Egypt DCS Singapore IND
El Salvador DCS Slovenia IND
Estonia DCS Spain IND
Fiji DCS Sri Lanka DCS
France IND Sudan DCS
Germany IND Swaziland DCS
Greece IND Tanzania DCS
India DCS Tunisia DCS
Iran DCS Uganda DCS
Ireland IND Ukraine DCS
Italy IND United Arab Emirates DCS
Jamaica DCS United States IND
Japan IND Uruguay DCS
Jordan DCS Vanuatu DCS
Kazakhstan DCS Venezuela DCS
Kenya DCS Vietnam DCS
Lebanon DCS Yemen DCS
Libya DCS Zambia DCS
Luxembourg IND Zimbabwe DCS
Macedonia DCS
DCS denotes developing countries and IND indicates industrial
economies.
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we explain how to construct the central bank independence
measure. Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1994) develop four measures of central
bank independence and measure their correlation with the inflation outcomes. The legal
index, the rate of turnover of central bank governors, an index based on a questionnaire
answered by specialists and an aggregation of the legal index with the turnover rate.
They conclude that the legal independence is negatively related to the inflation in
industrial countries, but not in developing countries. We consider the turnover of central
bank governors as an index for central bank independence. We use the turnover index
because this index is more accurate than the legal index or questionnaire based criterion
in the emerging market economies. This index is more accurate in those countries
because of the fact that the legal index is based on central bank laws and it doesn’t
reflect the central bank independence.
We construct the index based on the findings of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti
(1994) by assuming that above a threshold, a rapid turnover of central bank governors
determines a higher dependence and a lower ICBI . If the political authorities frequently
choose a new governor, they have the opportunity to pick those who favor the nominators’
will. Frequent turnover reflects firing those who challenge the government. This is true
especially in developing countries. Therefore, the measure for this index is in accordance
with the electoral cycle for the central banks. If the turnover of central bank governor is
four years the index will be .25, and so on.
Using the turnover index, we find the central bank independence for all inflation
targeters. Table B1 presents the average annual turnover rates in our sample countries
for two time periods, 1980–1999 and 2000–2013. The average annual turnover rates
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are calculated from the ratio of governor changes to the number of years in that period.
The average turnover rate during 1980–1999 ranges from a minimum of 0.0 to a
maximum of 0.2. An average turnover of 0.0 indicates no change in the last 20 years.
Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the United Kingdom are the few
examples of totally independent structures. However, countries like Chile, Poland and
Turkey have the highest rates of dependency. The central banks’ independence has
increased from the period 1980– 1999 to 2000– 2013. In the first period, there are
five countries with totally independent central banks; whereas, after 2000 it has risen
to 13 countries. In general, the average annual turnover rate reduced significantly in
15 countries, i.e. the degree of central bank independence has been increasing over time.
Table B1: Average annual turnover rates of central bank governors in
targeters
Countries 1980–1999 2000–2013 Countries 1980–1999 2000–2013
Armenia 0.10 0.07 New Zealand 0.15 0.07
Australia 0.05 0.00 Norway 0.15 0.00
Brazil 0.05 0.07 Peru NA 0.14
Canada 0.00 0.00 Philippines 0.15 0.07
Chile 0.20 0.07 Poland 0.20 0.14
Colombia 0.00 0.07 Romania 0.15 0.00
Czech 0.00 0.00 Serbia NA 0.21
Ghana 0.15 0.21 South Africa 0.05 0.00
Guatemala NA NA South Korea 0.10 0.00
Hungary 0.00 0.00 Sweden 0.10 0.14
Iceland 0.10 0.00 Thailand 0.15 0.00
Indonesia 0.05 0.00 Turkey 0.20 0.00
Israel 0.15 0.14 UK 0.00 0.00
Mexico 0.10 0.14
Average number of changes a year Schmidt-Hebbel (2009).
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